freedom of expression, since it does not establish clear parameters to define the prohibited conducts and their elements. 50 70. The Chilean legal system– more specifically the Criminal Code- differentiates between slander (Articles 412 to 415) and insults (Articles 416 to 420), and also contains provisions common to both offenses (Articles 421 to 431). Note that the crime of insult is actually composed of two criminal offenses, namely: minor insults, provided for in Article 416 and whose penalty is established in Article 419; and serious insults, established in Article 417 and whose penalty is established in Article 418. 71. This does not mean that conduct which in other legal systems could be classified as defamation is not criminalized. In fact, it is contemplated in the criminal offense of insult, 51 more specifically in the offense of serious insult (Article 417). 52 Considering that the Chilean court convicted the petitioner for the latter offense, it is important to analyze the wording of the provision: ARTICLE 417. Serious insults consist of: 1. The imputation of a crime or simple offense that does not give rise to ex officio proceedings. 2. The imputation of a punishable or prescribed crime or simple offense. 3. The imputation of a vice or lack of morality whose consequences may significantly harm the reputation, credit or interests of the victim. 4. Insults that by their nature, occasion or circumstances are understood by the public as affronts. 5. Those that rationally deserve the classification of serious due to the status, dignity and circumstances of the offended party and the offender. 72. The Inter-American Court considers that the criminal offense in question suffers from a high degree of imprecision, especially Article 417, paragraphs 4 and 5, since the circumstances that would make the insult “serious” or an ���affront” are not specified. The same is true of paragraph 3, given the vagueness of the expression "vice or lack of morality.” These criminal definitions are also problematic because, in theory, they allow for the punishment of the attribution of true facts. 73. This is also the technical-legal opinion issued by Martín Prats, the expert witness offered by the petitioner’s representatives, who stated the following during the public hearing held on June 20, 2022: 53 Regarding the principle of legality, the provisions cited and on which the judgments of the Chilean courts were based, namely, Articles 416 and 417(3) of the Criminal Code, do not meet the requirements of clarity and accuracy in defining the proscribed conduct that would allow the defendant to know and understand the prohibition and thus to anticipate it. This is also similar to the Court’s ruling in the case of Canese v. Paraguay of 2004, where it expressly stated that laws that establish Merits Report (evidence file, fl. 28-30) On this legislative option cf. MONTT, Mario Garrido. Derecho Penal Parte Especial, Tome III, Third ed., Santiago: Editorial Jurídica de Chile, 2007, p. 187. 52 “Defamatory insult” even includes conduct that in other legal systems falls within the criminal definition of defamation, since it is defined as “the imputation of a crime or simple offense that does not give rise to an ex officio proceeding” (Art. 417, para. 1) and “imputation of a punishable or prescribed crime or simple offense” (Art. 417, para. 2). This differentiation occurs because the crime of slander consists of the “imputation of a specific but false crime that may currently be prosecuted ex officio.” (Art. 412). 53 Statement of Martín Prats before the Court at the public hearing on June 20, 2022. 50 51