advances made by the Inter-American Court in recent years in guaranteeing the right to freedom of expression. This notable development is based on the recognition that the protection through criminal law of the honor of public officials against slander and the imputation of offensive acts, except in the case of the false attribution of a crime, which was not discussed in this case, is not compatible with the Convention. It expands the scope of the protection established by the InterAmerican Court in the cases of Álvarez Ramos v. Venezuela, and Palacio Urrutia v. Ecuador, in which it declared the inadmissibility of the persecutio criminis aimed at suppressing expression on matters of public interest. 96. By linking the inapplicability of criminal measures to the offended party’s status as a public official, and not only to an a posteriori judgment on the “public interest” of speech considered harmful, the Court’s decision contributes decisively to mitigating the chilling effect of criminal laws from the first moment in which they could affect the enjoyment of freedom of expression, thereby preventing the weakening and impoverishment of debate on matters of public interest. 97. As we have explained in this opinion, we believe that this judgment represents a significant step forward in the line of jurisprudence that aims to reduce the use of criminal law to establish subsequent liabilities in the exercise of the right to freedom of expression. Thus, in relation to public officials, the standard is that it is not possible to invoke and bring a criminal action for subsequent liabilities to protect their right to honor against the attribution of offenses and offensive acts. An action brought by a public official would be inadmissible ab initio under this standard. This does not imply a lack of protection for this right, but rather the need to resort to other non-criminal remedies in order to demand its protection. 98. Finally, let us remember that the standards developed by the Inter-American Court not only have an impact on the specific case (res judicata) but also provide a jurisprudential input for other States that can be validly applied in their domestic systems, regardless of whether the State has been a party to the international litigation (res interpretata). Therefore, the decision in this case that the criminal protection of the honor of public officials against offenses and the imputation of offensive acts, except in the case of false attribution of a crime, is not compatible with the American Convention, constitutes a new guideline to be used at the domestic level to evaluate such cases through the control of conventionality.