- 35 - 96. The Court notes that State authorities acknowledged the State’s omissive attitude with regard to the measures of protection.126 For example, when ruling on the failure to comply with the “obligation to protect,” the Administrative Court, found that “the Administration’s responsibility was engaged through the Ministry of Defense and the Administrative Department of Security (DAS), to the extent that these institutions did not comply adequately with their constitutional and legal obligations of protection, because they did not take appropriate security measures to protect the deceased Senator’s life.”127 The Council of State itself indicated that, in response to the Senator’s requests to protect his life made “directly, publicly, officially and through the InterAmerican Commission, the State’s response was almost inexistent,” even though the grave danger that he and other members of the PCC and the UP faced was public knowledge.128 For its part, when making an extensive analysis of the relevant facts and circumstances of the murder in its July 1997 Evaluation Report, the office of the Second District Attorney considered that the alleged “coup de grâce plan” had been denounced and noted the omissive conduct of other officials, including that of “the District Administration and high echelons of the National Executive.”129 97. The Court observes that, in addition to alleging that it had taken various measures to counter the violence against the UP (supra para. 95), the State only offered Senator Cepeda Vargas the protection of the DAS, which he rejected. Indeed, the Council of State indicated that “[i]t has merely been recorded that the DAS helped pay for a private escort.”130 The explanation for this could be that, as the Rapporteurs on torture and extrajudicial executions mention, “in a number of cases the security forces themselves, [...] are said to be at the origin of the threats [so that] not surprisingly, there appears to be reluctance on the part of those under threat to seek the protection of escorts provided by State institutions.” 131 98. Despite the precautionary measures and the different complaints, several of the individuals indicated as victims of the said “coup de grâce plan,” were indeed threatened, murdered, or suffered an attempt on their life. Senator Manuel Cepeda 126 Cf. decision issued by the office of the Second District Attorney de Santafé de Bogotá in case No. 1436444/96, in 1999, supra note 81, folio 1461 and judgment handed down by the Third Section of the Decision Chamber of the Administrative Court (de Descongestión) of Bogotá in case No. 12680 on February 8, 2001 (evidence file, tome IV, attachment 34 to the application, folio 1972). 127 Judgment handed down by the Third Section of the Decision Chamber of the Administrative Court (de Descongestión) of Bogotá in case No. 12680 on February 8, 2001, supra note 126, folio 1972. See also Decision issued by the office of the Second District Attorney for Santafé de Bogotá, in case No. 143-6444/96, in 1999, p. 24, supra note 81, folio 1484, deciding to sanction Hernán Arias Gaviria because “based on his omission, the request for measures of security was not dealt with adequately and opportunely.” 128 Cf. Appeal judgment delivered by the Third Section of the Administrative-law Chamber of the Council of State in investigation No. 250002326000199612680-01 (20,511) on November 20, 2008 (evidence file, tome X, attachment 165 to the brief with pleadings, motions and evidence, folios 4523 and 4524). 129 The report concluded with the recommendation to open a disciplinary investigation against the said Army sergeants; however, owing to his death, the investigation of Colonel Rodolfo Herrera Luna, who had been identified as the “mastermind” of the facts, was discontinued. In addition, the report noted the “omissive conduct of the “District Administration,” and also of the then Secretary of Government of Santafé de Bogotá (Heman Arias Gaviria), and two coordinators from his office, because they failed to respond opportunely to requests for protection for Mr. Cepeda Vargas. In addition, it noted possible omissive conducts of “high echelons of the National Executive,” and indicated that it was for the Attorney General of the Nation to take the pertinent decision regarding the former Ministers of Defense (Rafael Pardo Rueda) and of Foreign Affairs (Nohemi Sanín Posada de Rubio) and the former Director of the DAS (Fernando Brito). There is no record of any action in this regard. Cf. 1997 Assessment by the office of the Santa Fe de Bogotá Second District Attorney in case No. 143-6444, supra note 96, folios 1417 and ff. 130 Appeal judgment delivered by the Third Section of the Administrative-law Chamber of the Council of State in Investigation No. 250002326000199612680-01 (20,511) on November 20, 2008, supra note 128, folio 4523. 131 Joint report of the Special Rapporteur on the question of torture, Mr. Nigel S. Rodley, and the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye, on their visit to Colombia, para. 47, supra note 85, folio 1127.