10 employees as natural persons, so that it finds the preliminary objection of lack of jurisdiction filed by the State inadmissible. However, the Court considers it necessary to underscore that the fact that a legal entity is involved in the facts of the case does not signify, prima facie, that the preliminary objection is admissible, because the exercise of the right by a natural person or its presumed violation must be analyzed when examining the merits of the case. Therefore, the other arguments of the Commission and the parties concerning how natural persons would exercise rights presumably violated through a legal entity will be analyzed in detail in the chapter corresponding to each right. B) Objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies B.1. Arguments of the Commission and of the parties 23. The State filed an objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies. It argued that “the Commission did not take into consideration the failure to exhaust [the said] remedies […], included in the briefs presented by the State on December 4, 2011, and November 9, 2012.” The State argued that “the delay in a specific judicial proceeding cannot be measured only by the time that has passed since the remedy was filed; rather, its complexity, the procedural activity of the parties, the conduct of the judicial authorities and the effects produced on the legal situation of those involved should also be analyzed.” In this regard, the State indicated that the Supreme Court of Justice processed “thousands of cases” so that it cannot be concluded that “there is, prima facie, an unjustified procedural delay in this case.” In addition, it indicated that its “laws establish a wide range of remedies and actions that may be used by the defense of [the presumed victims], to substantiate their rights and interests.” 24. The Commission argued that the objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies was “inadmissible because it was time-barred.” In this regard, it indicated that the procedural opportunity to file this objection was “during the admissibility procedure before the Commission” and that “owing to the lack of a response [by Venezuela at that stage], the mechanism of a tacit waiver by the State comes into operation.” It also argued that the State’s briefs of December 4, 2011, and November 9, 2012, “were subsequent to the adoption of the Admissibility Report by the Commission.” 25. In addition, the Commission indicated that “[f]urthermore, there was an unjustified delay at the admissibility stage.” It argued that when “analyzing the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies, it took note of the two remedies that were pending a decision.” In this regard, it indicated that “the appeal for nullification was at the initial stage and [that] the appeal against the interim measures had not elicited any response from the Supreme Court of Justice, even though four years had elapsed.” Consequently, the Commission concluded that “the exception to the exhaustion of domestic remedies established in Article 46(2)(c) [of the Convention] had been activated” and asked the Court to “reject the […] preliminary objection filed […] by the Venezuelan State.” 26. The representatives indicated that the “objection should be rejected as time-barred, unfounded and inadmissible because this case has met the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies pursuant to Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention […].” They argued that “the State, by failing to respond to the petition […] before the Commission before the latter took a decision on its admissibility, tacitly waived filing the [said] objection.” Likewise, they argued that since, at the admissibility stage, the State had failed to contest the “information on the unjustified delay in the processing of the matter in the domestic jurisdiction and the legal consequences derived from this delay, […] it was also prevented from contesting these facts for the first time before the Court.” In addition, they indicated that Venezuela had “merely