Article 30 of the Statute, after referring to the annual report and the identification of cases that have not complied with judgments, adds, after a full stop, that the Court “may also submit to the OAS General Assembly proposals or recommendations on ways to improve the Inter-American system of human rights, insofar as they concern the work of the Court.” That is, if the Court considered the present system inefficient or inadequate, what would follow would be for it to propose to the General Assembly of the OAS the modifications it deemed necessary; not for it to alter, through legislation, that which is established in the Convention and the Statute. Similarly, it is not appropriate to transform the regulatory mechanism for monitoring compliance with judgments in the prolongation of the already failed process, or in a new process, or, finally, in a case which ultimately involves, on the one hand, an excuse for failing to report promptly to the General Assembly of the OAS the lack of compliance with rulings of the Court, and, on the other, granting the State an extension, without, moreover, a deadline for compliance. This, for one, because such a situation would place the victims of human rights violations in a disadvantageous position, due to the need to extend litigation – this time against arguments of internal law which the State typically invokes to avoid complying with rulings, and which obviously would not arise in the trial proper.10 For its part, the Court itself is placed in a position in which, due to the lack of powers necessary for the enforcement of its rulings, it must rely on appeals or, rather, political pressure to ensure that the State in question honor its freely made sovereign commitment to comply with judgments.11 This mechanism cannot, therefore, strip the final judgment of its intrinsic value as “final and not subject to appeal,” nor affect the majesty of the Court’s function.12 We have even greater difficulty justifying the prolongation of the regulatory mechanism of monitoring compliance with judgments, without promptly informing the General Assembly of the OAS of any failure to comply, as occurs in the present case, when the Court has many of these types of cases open. As such, providing this information in one case would lead to the obligation to provide the same information in many of the rest of the cases; this could result in a serious political problem within the 3. Every State entitled to become a party to the treaty shall also be entitled to become a party to the treaty as amended. 4. The amending agreement does not bind any State already a party to the treaty which does not become a party to the amending agreement; article 30, paragraph 4(b), applies in relation to such State. 5. Any State which becomes a party to the treaty after the entry into force of the amending agreement shall, failing an expression of a different intention by that State: a) be considered as a party to the treaty as amended; and b) be considered as a party to the unamended treaty in relation to any party to the treaty not bound by the amending agreement.” 10  Art. 27 idem: “Internal law and observance of treaties.   A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to article 46.” 11 Art. 26 idem: “Pacta sunt servanda". “Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.” 12 Art. 67 of the Convention. 5