MERITS PERSONAL LIBERTY AND JUDICIAL GUARANTEES 22 54. The question the Court must examine in the present case is whether the preventive deprivation of liberty Mr. Carranza suffered as part of his criminal trial was compatible with the American Convention. It must also examine whether the criminal trial took place within a reasonable period of time. 55. The Court should make it clear that the object of this case is not the criminal sentence Mr. Carranza received, nor any alleged infringement of his right to personal integrity. This Court notes, first, that the Commission explained that in its Admissibility Report “the analysis of exhaustion of domestic remedies was carried out exclusively with reference to preventive detention.” For that reason, it only determined violations to the right to personal liberty and—understanding it to be “closely linked to [preventive detention]”—to the right to judicial guarantees regarding the length of the trial. 56. Second, although the representative mentioned Articles 5 and 25 of the Convention, referring to the rights to personal integrity and judicial protection, he did not develop relevant arguments but merely described the criminal trial and the deprivation of liberty. He only asserted that there was “solitary confinement and psychological pressure,” in an interrogation without a lawyer present. He made these statements as well as a cursory reference to the conditions of detention, without elaborating on his arguments or on the description of the referenced events. Considering all of the above, the Court does not have sufficient support for examining alleged violations to the rights of personal integrity or judicial protection. Thus, it will not examine the representative’s allegations regarding Articles 5 and 25 of the Convention. It will limit its examination to the allegations regarding deprivation of liberty and the reasonableness of the length of the criminal trial. A) Allegations of the Commission and the parties 57. The Commission noted that Mr. Carranza’s preventive detention “[was based] essentially on [...] elements that point[ed] toward his responsibility” and that the relevant law, Article 177 of the CCP, established indications of responsibility—not “procedural purposes”—as the only requirement for deprivation of liberty. It viewed that law, as well as decisions based on it, as arbitrary. In addition, it observed that the preventive detention lasted a little more than four years, with no periodic review of its continuation. It inferred that the preventive detention in this case was arbitrary and punitive, violating personal liberty and presumption of innocence. The Commission understood Articles 7(1), 7(3), 7(5), and 8(2) of the American Convention as having been violated, in conjunction with its Articles 1(1) and 2. Moreover, “it observe[d] significant delays in the conduct of the trial” after Mr. Carranza’s imprisonment. 23 Thus, it understood that the State infringed Mr. Carranza’s right to be tried in a reasonable amount of time, violating Article 8(1) of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1(1) of the same treaty. 22 Articles 7 and 8 of the American Convention. The Commission indicated that “on February 23, 1995, the Judge arranged for [Mr. Carranza’s] transfer in order to give investigatory testimony, which took place on the following August 25th. In addition, Mr. Carranza presented a brief on September 11, 1995, and it was a year later, September 30, 1996, when the preliminary proceedings were closed and the case was sent to the prosecutor for a ruling. [Also,] another year and nine months passed between the March 1997 ruling and the December 1998 public hearing.” 23 13