58. The representative claimed that the preventive detention order was issued “without [Mr. Carranza] [having been] notified in any way.” He stated that he had been illegally deprived of liberty by members of the rural police because “they did not show [him] the detention order or inform him of the reasons for his detention.” He also claimed that Mr. Carranza remained in preventive detention for over four years and that the State “deliberately” delayed the trial in order to infringe his rights beyond a reasonable time frame, 24 which constituted a “flagrant” violation of his rights. The representative claimed that Articles 7 and 8 of the Convention had been violated but did not specify which paragraphs. 59. The State denied responsibility. It stated that the preventive detention of Mr. Carranza ordered by the competent authority had a legal basis and was necessary because as he was a fugitive. It asserted that this precautionary measure was appropriate, well-supported, and intended to ensure that Mr. Carranza appeared at trial. It stated that the preventive detention was ordered on the basis of “strictly necessary criteria” and that the presumption of innocence was respected. In that regard, the measure was based on indications that a crime had been committed but also on the fact that Mr. Carranza was a fugitive, so “the circumstances determined the preventive detention.” Moreover, it stated that while Mr. Carranza was deprived of his liberty, he did not request the remedies of habeas corpus or amparo of liberty, which were the effective remedies for challenging the allegedly excessive length of the preventive detention. The State also argued that four years (from the detention of Mr. Carranza) to obtain a criminal sentence “is within reasonable inter-American parameters.” It also claimed the presumed victim “delayed the criminal trial for more than a year when he was a fugitive.” B) Considerations of the Court 60. The Court has maintained that the essence of Article 7 of the American Convention is the protection of individual liberty against any arbitrary or illegal interference by the State. 25 It has affirmed that this article has two quite distinct types of regulations: one general and one specific. The general one is in the first subparagraph: “[e]very person has the right to personal liberty and security.” The specific one is composed of a set of guarantees that protect the right to not be deprived of liberty unlawfully (Article 7(2)) or arbitrarily (Article 7(3)), to be informed of the reasons for their detention and the charges against them (Article 7(4)), to judicial review of the deprivation of liberty and the reasonableness of the length of the preventive detention (Article 7(5)), to contest the lawfulness of the detention (Article 7(6)), and to not be detained for debt (Article 7(7)). 26 Any violation of subparagraphs 2 through 7 of Article 24 The representative, among his arguments on the infringement of the reasonable time frame, noted that Mr. Carranza “ended up serving more than the time of the sentence,” because “on May 17, 1997, before [he] was convicted, [A]rticles 33 and 34 of the Sentencing Implementation and Rehabilitation Code were modified[,] automatically reducing the sentence to 180 days per year for those inmates who have been sentenced and those without a sentence who have good behavior.” He noted that Mr. Carranza “only needed to serve three years in prison.” 25 Cf. Case of the “Juvenile Reeducation Institute” v. Paraguay. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 2, 2004. Series C No. 112, para. 223 and Case of Jenkins v. Argentina, para. 71. Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, para. 51, and Case of Jenkins v. Argentina, para. 71. 26 14