7 of the Convention will necessarily entail the violation of Article 7(1) of the same. 27 In this regard, it is worth recalling the following insofar as it is relevant to this case. 61. Article 7(2) of the Convention establishes that “[n]o one shall be deprived of his physical liberty except for the reasons and under the conditions established beforehand by the constitution of the State Party concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto.” This subparagraph recognizes the main guarantee of the right to physical liberty: the legal exception, according to which the right to personal liberty can only be affected by a law. 28 The legal exception must necessarily be accompanied by the principle of legal definition of the offense (tipicidad), which obliges the States to establish, as specifically as possible and “beforehand,” the “reasons” and “conditions” for the deprivation of physical liberty. Furthermore, it must be applied with strict adherence to the procedures objectively established in the law. 29 Hence, Article 7(2) of the Convention refers automatically to domestic law. Any requirement established in domestic law that is not complied with when depriving a person of his liberty will cause this deprivation to be unlawful and contrary to the American Convention. 30 62. Regarding the prohibition of “arbitrariness” in the deprivation of liberty, mandated by Article 7(3) of the Convention, the Court has established that no one may be subjected to arrest or imprisonment for reasons and using methods that—although classified as legal—can be considered incompatible with respect for the fundamental rights of the individual because they are, among other matters, unreasonable, unpredictable, or disproportionate. 31 It has taken the view that domestic law, applicable procedures, and corresponding general principles—both express and tacit—must themselves be compatible with the Convention. Thus, the concept of “arbitrariness” should not be equated with that of “contrary to the law;” rather, it should be interpreted more broadly so as to include the elements of impropriety, injustice, and unpredictability. 32 63. Regarding Article 7(4), this Court has stated that “this refers to two guarantees for the individual who is being detained: i) oral or written information on the reasons for the detention, and ii) notification of the charges, which must be in writing.” 33 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, para. 54, and Case of Jenkins v. Argentina, para. 71. 27 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, para. 55, and Case of Romero Feris v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of October 15, 2019. Series C No. 391, para. 77. 28 29 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, para. 57, and Case of Romero Feris v. Argentina, para. 77. 30 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, para. 57, and Case of Romero Feris v. Argentina, para. 77. Cf. Case of Gangaram Panday v. Suriname. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of January 21, 1994. Series C No. 16, para. 47 and Case of Jenkins v. Argentina, para. 73. 31 32 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, para. 92, and Case of Jenkins v. Argentina, para. 73. 33 The Court has explained that: “the information on the ‘reasons’ for the detention must be provided ‘at the time of the arrest,’ and this is a mechanism to avoid unlawful or arbitrary detentions at the very moment of the deprivation of liberty and, also, to ensure the individual’s right of defense. In addition, this Court has indicated that the agent who makes the arrest must provide information, in simple, jargon-free language of the fundamental facts and legal grounds on which the detention is based and that the provisions of Article 7(4) of the Convention are not met if only the legal grounds are mentioned. If the person is not adequately informed of the reasons for the detention, including the facts and their legal grounds, he does not know the charges 15