would be tantamount to anticipating a sentence, 40 which would violate not only the right to personal liberty but also the presumption of innocence set forth in Article 8(2) of the Convention. In cases in which a person is deprived of liberty, the duration of the procedural actions constitutes another link between the right to personal liberty and judicial guarantees. Thus, the Court has indicated that “the purpose of the principle of ‘reasonable time’ to which Articles 7(5) and 8(1) of the American Convention refer is to prevent accused persons from remaining in that situation for a protracted period and to ensure that the charge is promptly disposed of.” 41 68. Based on the above and on more specific rules detailed below, this Court will examine the facts of the case. Thus, it will analyze: i) the detention and preventive detention orders for Mr. Carranza, ii) review of the preventive detention, iii) the reasonableness of the time taken, and iv) observance of the principle of presumption of innocence. Lastly, it will present its conclusion. B.1 Detention and preventive detention orders for Mr. Carranza B.1.1 Initial detention 69. Mr. Carranza was apprehended in November 1994, after a superintendent had issued an arrest warrant in August 1993, as well as an order for “preventive detention” on the basis of Article 177 of the CCP (supra para. 36), 42 and after the October 28, 1993, judicial confirmation of said order. 70. The arrest warrant made reference to the fact that Mr. Carranza was “a fugitive.” The Court views that statement as a reference to a situation of fact, described in the police report of a person shot and killed: that after the shots were fired, Mr. Carranza fled on horseback (supra para. 36 and footnote on page 16). 71. Given the circumstances of the case, the Court does not view as arbitrary the decision of the superintendent to order the Rural Police to “apprehen[d]” Mr. Carranza, “as he [was] a fugitive,” and given that fact, to bring him before said superintendent “in order to proceed in accordance with the law.” 43 In addition, the existence of a legal basis for ordering Mr. Carranza to be detained was not challenged by the parties or the Commission. 72. Moreover, even though it is documented that Mr. Carranza was apprehended in November 1994, neither the Commission nor the representative specified the day on which that occurred or described the specific circumstances of the arrest. The Court considers Mr. Carranza’s allegations before the Commission regarding a failure to present the arrest warrant and an initial failure to communicate as insufficient for concluding, in this case, that Mr. Carranza’s detention was unlawful or that he had not been informed of the reasons for his detention or the charges against him. Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Merits. Judgment of November 12, 1997. Series C No. 35, para. 77, and Case of Rosadio Villavicencio v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of October 14, 2019. Series C No. 388, para. 214. 40 41 Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Merits, para. 70. 42 Regarding the actions of the superintendent, the Court notes that the 1983 CCP stated in its Article 4 that “police superintendents [...] [have] criminal authority in cases and procedures as determined by law.” Neither the Commission nor the parties put forth arguments related to the authority of the superintendent. 43 Cf. Order of August 15, 1993. Evidence file, annex 2 to the answer, folios 524 to 526. 17