the administrative authority does not constitute an effective remedy under the standards of the American Convention. 15. The Court has held that an objection to the exercise of its jurisdiction based on the supposed failure to exhaust domestic remedies should be presented at the appropriate procedural time, that is, during the admissibility proceedings before the Commission. 7 Failing which, the State will have lost the possibility of presenting it. In addition, the State presenting this objection must specify the domestic remedies that have yet to be exhausted, as well as provide an account of its availability and effectiveness with respect to the circumstances of the case. 8 In this regard, a remedy must be effective, that is, capable of producing the result for which it was created. 9 16. This Court notes that the State indicated four remedies. Two of those, according to the State, permitted challenging the guilty verdict: cassation and review. Two others permitted contesting the preventive detention: the liberty amparo and habeas corpus. 17. Regarding the remedies of cassation and review, the State’s arguments themselves indicate that those remedies are for challenging the guilty verdict, not for contesting, prior to the issuance of that judgment, the deprivation of liberty Mr. Carranza was enduring in the form of preventive detention. Thus, Ecuador has not presented sufficient arguments to show that such remedies were suitable and effective to appropriately remedy the alleged violation in the case. 18. In addition, it is not appropriate to examine the arguments on amparo because the State did not present them at the appropriate time. It mentioned them for the first time as support for a preliminary objection before the Court, so the arguments are not timely. 19. What is left to examine is the State’s argument on habeas corpus. In this respect, it follows from the foregoing (supra para. 15) that in order for a preliminary objection to proceed due to noncompliance with Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention, which establishes the requirement of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies, the State that presents the objection must indicate a remedy that is available and effective for the circumstances of the case. 20. It is relevant to bear in mind that the preventive detention of Mr. Carranza lasted from November 1994 to December 1998 (supra para. 1). The State reported that during that period, the Constitution of Ecuador provided for habeas corpus, both in its 1993 text and in the 1996 and 1998 revisions. As the State has reported, in all three cases, the respective law established that habeas corpus could be exercised to demand liberty before the “Mayor” (“or President of the Council” in the 1993 version), “or before their substitute” (or “before whoever may be substituting,” in the 1996 version). Ecuador Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 1, para. 88, and Case of Díaz Loreto et al. v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 19, 2019. Series C No. 392, para. 16. 7 In that regard: Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Preliminary Objections, para. 88, and Case of Perrone and Preckel v. Argentina. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of October 8, 2019. Series C No. 384, para. 33. 8 9 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 1, para. 66 and Case of Perrone and Preckel v. Argentina, paras. 33 and 36. 6