also noted that “for the year 1998, if this remedy was denied by the mayor, it could be appealed before the former Constitutional Court.” 21. As the Court has noted in previous decisions, the mayor, even when he or she may have jurisdiction under the law, does not constitute an authority that meets the requirements of the Convention. This is because, under Article 7(6) of the Convention, control of deprivation of liberty shall be judicial (“before an appropriate judge or court”), and the mayor is part of the Administration. In its examination of cases on Ecuador, this Court has also found that the requirement of appealing the mayor's decisions in order for habeas corpus to be heard by a judicial authority creates obstacles to a remedy that should by its very nature be simple. 10 Thus, as the Court has expressed in its case law on Ecuador, the remedy of habeas corpus indicated by the State does not constitute an effective remedy. 22. For all these reasons, the Court concludes that the State’s arguments are not sufficient to support its claim of a failure to exhaust domestic remedies. Thus, it is appropriate to reject the preliminary objection lodged by Ecuador. B) Alleged violation of the right to defense 23. The State argued that the Commission “took some steps without guaranteeing due process in the development of the present case.” It divided its arguments into two groups: one related to the “lack of motivation in the Admissibility Report” and the other “on the Merits Report [...] and compliance with recommendations.” It noted, specifically, that: a) the preliminary objection regarding a failure to exhaust domestic remedies was presented by the State in the period of admissibility and was not considered in the Admissibility Report, which shows that the Commission did not analyze the “legal position” of the State and, thus, there was an “absence of motivation” in its determinations, and b) the Merits Report: i.- was not “adequately motivated,” as it did not analyze the remedy of habeas corpus as a guarantee of respect for the right to personal liberty; ii.- asserted that a request for liberty for Mr. Carranza was not considered, “which does not correspond to the procedural facts;” and iii.- expressed recommendations and then “did not allow the State enough time to comply with [them].” 11 24. The Commission stated that “the Court’s case law indicates that the authority to carry out a ‘lawfulness review’ of the Commission’s actions must be exercised in the most limited and exceptional manner so as to not jeopardize the autonomy and independence of the Commission.” Furthermore, it asserted: a) regarding the claimed failure to consider habeas corpus in its decisions, that “it considered in its [A]dmissibility [R]eport that Mr. Carranza attempted an appropriate course of action through which the State had the opportunity to analyze the compatibility of the deprivation of liberty with 10 Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Iñiguez v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of November 21, 2007. Series C No. 170, para. 122 and Case of Herrera Espinoza et al. v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 1, 2016. Series C No. 316, para. 167. Ecuador maintained that the Commission had sent the case to the Court without considering that, as it was aware, the actions aimed at complying with the recommendations were being coordinated with the representative of the presumed victim. 11 7