the Convention;” and b) regarding the submission of the case to the Court, that that decision is within the “purview” of the Commission and that in this case it had granted extensions to the State “without the State presenting concrete, detailed information.” 25. The Court has indicated that in matters under its consideration, it has the authority to review the lawfulness of the Commission's actions, but this does not necessarily mean reviewing ex officio the proceedings that took place before the Commission. In addition, the Court must maintain a fair balance between the protection of human rights—the ultimate goal of the inter-American system—and the legal certainty and procedural fairness that ensure the stability and reliability of international protection. This review can occur, then, in those cases in which one of the parties argues that a serious error has violated its right of defense, in which case the party concerned must effectively prove that harm. A complaint or difference of opinion in relation to the Inter-American Commission’s actions is not sufficient. 12 26. The Court recalls that the Convention does not demand an express act on the part of the Commission regarding the admission of a complaint, and, for that reason, it does not regulate the content of Admissibility Reports. Without prejudice to the foregoing, the motivation in the Commission’s reports enables the State to know that its defenses were considered by that body as it made its decision, though a detailed response to every single argument of the parties is not required. 13 27. This Court notes that it is true that the Commission did not explicitly address the failure to present the remedy of habeas corpus either in the Admissibility Report or in the Merits Report. However, the Commission considered a brief that was reportedly presented in September 1995 to the court hearing the criminal trial against Mr. Carranza to be an appropriate action for contesting his deprivation of liberty. The Court understands that neither the Admissibility Report nor the Merits Report lacked motivation. A reading of both of them shows that, in the view of the Commission, the September 1995 brief was sufficient, so it did not need to explicitly address habeas corpus in its decisions. Whether the State shares the Commission’s view on this is another question, but as has already been noted, a simple difference of opinion is not sufficient to prompt a review of the Commission’s actions (supra para. 25). 28. Furthermore, the Court notes that the State claimed that the Commission’s assertion in the Merits Report that the September 1995 brief was not considered by the justice system “does not correspond to the procedural facts.” This disagreement by the State with the views of the Commission refers to aspects of the merits of the case. 29. What remains to be considered is the State’s argument on the lack of adequate time to comply with the Commission’s recommendations. In accordance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Convention, the Commission is responsible for assessing whether the State complied with the recommendations and, if applicable, whether it will refer the case to the Court. Once the legal proceedings have begun, the Court must determine whether Cf. Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 28, 2007. Series C No. 172, para. 32 and Case of Women Victims of Sexual Torture in Atenco v. Mexico. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 28, 2018. Series C No. 371, para. 23. 12 In that regard, the considerations made by this Court in its case law are pertinent: cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No. 182, para. 90, and Case of Rico v. Argentina. Preliminary Objection and Merits. Judgment of September 2, 2019. Series C No. 383, para. 75. 13 8