in its opinion, had not been exhausted. 30. Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the Court to determine whether, at the time of the Commission’s assessment of admissibility, the domestic remedies had been exhausted or whether any of the grounds stipulated as exceptions to the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies were applicable. The Court observes that the argument used by the representatives to justify the presentation of the initial petition in the case before the Commission, on March 28, 2000,25 was the impossibility of exhausting domestic remedies (Article 46(2)(b) of the Convention) because the Legislative Assembly of Paraíba had not authorized the initiation of criminal proceedings, in application of parliamentary immunity. Subsequently, on October 2, 2006,26 the representatives argued the hypothesis of Article 46(2)(c), citing an excessive delay in the processing of the criminal proceeding examining the alleged murder of Márcia Barbosa de Souza. In its Admissibility Report of July 26, 2007, the Commission agreed with the representatives in considering that there was an unwarranted delay in the processing of the aforementioned criminal case.27 31. In this regard, it should be noted that at the time when the petition was submitted to the Commission, two years after the murder of Márcia Barbosa de Souza, criminal proceedings had not been initiated because the Legislative Assembly of Paraíba had not lifted the immunity of Mr. Aércio Pereira de Lima; therefore, at that time, the exception to the exhaustion of domestic remedies provided for in Article 46(2)(b) of the Convention was applicable. At the time the Commission issued the Admissibility Report, in 2007, the criminal proceedings against the then congressman Aércio Pereira de Lima had not been concluded, and more than nine years had already passed since the murder of Ms. Barbosa de Souza. 32. The Court recalls that one of the main disputes in the instant case is whether the State is responsible for violating the guarantee of reasonable time, given the duration of the criminal proceedings for the homicide in question. In this regard, the Court considers that determining whether the time elapsed constituted an unwarranted delay, in the terms of Article 46(2)(c) of the American Convention, is a debate that is directly related to the merits of the case regarding Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention. 33. The State also argued in its answering brief that the verification of the exhaustion of domestic remedies by the Commission should have been carried out when the representatives' initial petition was presented, and not when the admissibility decision was issued. However, the Court has already pointed out that the fact that the analysis of compliance with the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies is carried out at the time of deciding on the admissibility of the petition does not affect the subsidiary nature of the inter-American system, and in fact allows the State to resolve the alleged situation during the admissibility stage.28 This Court finds no reason to depart from the aforementioned criterion. 34. Consequently, since there is a close relationship between the State's preliminary objection and the analysis of the merits of the dispute, the Court dismisses the preliminary objection filed by the State. Cf. Initial petition of the representatives of March 28, 2000 (evidence file, folios 731 to 741). Cf. Communication of the petitioners to the Inter-American Commission of October 2, 2006 (evidence file, folios 641 to 648). 27 Cf. Admissibility Report No. 38/07 (evidence file, folios 383 to 393). 28 Cf. Case of Wong Ho Wing v. Peru. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 30, 2015. Series C No. 297, para. 28, and Case of the National Association of Discharged and Retired Employees of the National Tax Administration Superintendence (ANCEJUB-SUNAT) v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 21, 2019. Series C No. 394, para. 22. 25 26 -12-