127. The Court has held that due diligence will be demonstrated in criminal proceedings if the State succeeds in proving that it has made every effort, within a reasonable time, to enable the determination of the truth and to identify and punish all those responsible, whether private individuals or State officials.225 128. Likewise, the Court has consistently pointed out that the duty to investigate is an obligation of means and not of results, which must be assumed by the State as its own legal obligation and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective, or as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof.226 In addition, the investigation must be serious, objective and effective, and be aimed at determining the truth and seeking the prosecution, capture and eventual trial and punishment of the perpetrators of the crimes.227 129. It should be recalled that, in cases of violence against women, the general obligations provided for in Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention are complemented and reinforced by the obligations under the Convention of Belém do Pará.228 Article 7(b) of said convention specifically obliges States Parties to ensure due diligence to “prevent, punish and eradicate violence against women.”229 Thus, when faced with an act of violence against a woman, it is particularly important that the authorities in charge of the investigation carry it out with determination and efficiency, taking into account society’s duty to reject violence against women and the State’s obligations to eradicate it and to provide victims with confidence in the State institutions for their protection.230 130. The Court has also indicated that the duty to investigate has additional implications when it concerns a woman who suffers death, mistreatment or impairment of her personal liberty within a general context of violence against women.231 It is often difficult to prove in practice that a murder or an act of violence against a woman has been perpetrated because of her gender. This difficulty sometimes stems from the absence of a thorough and effective with the support of the Americas and Caribbean Regional Office of the United Nations Entity for Gender and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women), in the context of the United Nations Secretary General’s “UNITE” Campaign to End Violence Against Women. Available at: https://www.unwomen.org//media/headquarters/attachments/sections/library/publications/2014/moof theo%20de%20protocolo.ashx?la=es. 225 Cf. Case of the Workers of the Fireworks Factory in Santo Antônio de Jesus v. Brazil, supra, para. 221. 226 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits, supra, para. 177, and Case of Garzón Guzmán et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 1, 2021. Series C No. 434, para. 67. 227 Cf. Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez v. Honduras. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 7, 2003. Series C No. 99, para. 127, and Case of Garzón Guzmán et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 67. 228 With regard to the investigation of acts committed against women, the application of the Belém do Pará Convention does not depend on an absolute degree of certainty as to whether or not the act to be investigated constituted violence against women under the terms of the Convention. In this sense, it should be emphasized that it is through compliance with the duty to investigate established in Article 7 of the Convention of Belém do Pará that, in several cases, it will be possible to arrive at certainty as to whether or not the act under investigation constituted violence against women. Compliance with this duty cannot, therefore, be made dependent on such certainty. In order to trigger the obligation to investigate under the terms of the Convention of Belém do Pará, it is sufficient that the act in question, in its materiality, presents characteristics that, if reasonably assessed, indicate the possibility that it is an act of violence against women. Cf. Case of Véliz Franco et al. v. Guatemala, supra, footnote 254, and Case of Velásquez Paiz et al. v. Guatemala, supra, footnote 293. 229 Cf. Case of Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 30, 2010. Series C No. 215, para. 193, and Case of Guzmán Albarracín et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 24, 2020. Series C No. 405, para. 177. 230 Cf. Case of Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico, supra, para. 193, and Case of Guzmán Albarracín et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 177. 231 Cf. Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”), supra, para. 293, and Case of Velásquez Paiz et al. v. Guatemala, Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 19, 2015. Series C No. 307, para. 146. -39-