11 25. Regarding this particular, the Court reiterates that stated in the Judgment, in the sense that it “observes that the medical act is acknowledged in numerous normative and declarative documents relating to the medical profession. For example, article 12 of the Code of Ethics and Deontology of the Physician’s Professional Association states that “[the] medical act is any activity or procedure performed by a physician in the exercise of the medical profession. It includes the following: acts of diagnosis, therapeutics and prognosis carried out by a physician when providing comprehensive care to patients, and also acts deriving directly therefrom. Such medical acts may only be exercised by members of the medical profession.” 26. Furthermore, the Court reminds that pointed out in its Judgment in the sense that “[n]o one shall be punished for having exercised a medical activity according to the deontology, whatever have been the circumstances or the beneficiaries of such activity” in the terms of Article 16 of Protocol I and Article 10 of Protocol II, both Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 1.2. The alleged retroactive application of criminal crimes 27. The State pointed out that “it is not inferred that Decree Law No. 25475 of May 6, 1992, be applied retroactively, regarding the various testimonial declarations given as evidence that Mrs. De La Cruz Flores remained in the aforementioned terrorist organization during the year 1992; and even one of the incriminatory testimonies affirmed that she belonged to the area of health until the month of February in 1992 as an Activist, after which she lower[ed] levels, and then she lost contact with the organization; while the other testimonies affirmed that she belonged to the terrorist organization ‘Sendero Luminoso’ until the month of April 1992 as an Activist, later descending to the position of ‘School’ and ‘Organization Support’, being evident that her participation within the subversive group was prolonged during the year 1992.” According to the State, in the respective procedural pieces, it specifies that the conduct of the victim “was foreseen and sanctioned by Article [288] “c” of the Penal Code derogated [by 1924], introduced by Law [No. 24953], to later be classified in Article [322] of the Penal Code of [1991], finally derogated by Article [5] of the Decree Law [No. 25475]. In this sense, the State concluded that “it is not inferred […] that the conduct of the accused has not occurred during the effect of Decree Law 25475.” Without prejudice to the aforementioned, the State added that the representative of the Public Ministry “established that the facts imputed to the accused […] occurred since 1989 until 1993, fixing in a definite manner the object of the criminal process, duly communicated to the procedural subjects. Over this basis of facts and of law, the oral trial was developed, and the procedural actors had the opportunity to discuss and question each one of the points that made up the object of the accusation.” 28. Likewise, connected with the criminal definition of the crime applied, the State indicated that the penalty established in the first instance was increased “because the norm permits it, because the appellant also was the Prosecutor that was aggravated by the penalty that was not compatible with the national legislation.” In any case, it stated that “the principle of interdiction of the pejorative reform applies and functions when resorting only to the accused regarding the penalty imposed, [and that] when they are crossed appeals like this, the ambit of the competence of a judge of appeal expands.” Also, the State stressed that it had observed “the relationship […] of the first annulled process regarding the second process, [so that in the] annulled process, 20 years of deprivation of liberty [was imposed][to Mrs. De La Cruz Flores] and if we compare one with the other, there is no […] violation.” Therefore, it concluded that “in the concrete case, none of the exceptional situations [established in the Penal Code], that [could] permit the judging [t]ribunal to reduce the penalty under the legal minimum were presented, and in this substantive context, the Supreme Court “corrected” the judgment