15 Indeed, as a complement of the principle of protection from ex post facto laws, the Court has referred to the “principle of retroactivity of the most favorable criminal law” that is oriented to the protection of the human person, and implies the application of such a norm that establishes a minor sentence for the imputed crime. Such principle of application of the most favorable law “is applied regarding laws that have been sanctioned before the issuance of [a] Judgment, as well as during its execution, since the [American] Convention does not establish a limit in that sense.” 20 In similar sense, the European Court has established that where there is a difference between the criminal law valid after and before the issuance of the judgment, tribunals shall apply the law which provisions are more favorable for the accused.21 * * * 42. Regarding the sentence imposed of the victim and her right to remain silent and not to self-incriminate, the Tribunal highlights that the States shall respect the minimum guarantees of the right to defense, among them, those contemplated in Article, 8(2) g) “of the Convention, according to which “[d]uring the proceedings, every person is entitled, with full equality, to the following minimum guarantees: […]the right not to be compelled to be a witness against [her]self or to plead guilty.” In the present case, the Tribunal observes that the Supreme Court indicated that “it [was] admissible to raise the sanction imposed since they warned about the circumstances that accompanied the commission of the crime and the conduct of the accused have not been properly accounted by the [j]udging Tribunal, since “the defendants assumed an obstructionist conduct during the judicial investigations, and there are no attenuating circumstances to reduce the sentence – the definition of the crime establishes a sentence of no less than 20 years, since they have denied the facts imputed to them.” 43. In this regard, the Court considers that the judgment of the Supreme Court could not result in a negative consequence –increase of the sentence- against Mrs. De la Cruz, using as an argument her denial of culpability. In a similar sense the European Court has stated that there might be a violation of the right to a fair trial if the tribunal bases its judgment or derives negative consequences for the accused, exclusively or mainly from the refusal to declare.22 * * * 44. In the other hand, regarding the definition of the crime applied to the victim, the Tribunal highlights that the Decree Law No. 25475 was issued “[to] [e]stablish the sanction of the crimes of terrorism and the procedures for the investigation, the instruction and the trial [of the same]”. Thus, this decree criminalizes, among others, the following conducts: Article 4.- Collaboration with Terrorism It shall be punished with sentence of imprisonment of no less than twenty years anyone who “voluntarily obtains, collects, assembles or facilitates any type of supplies or devices, or carries out acts of collaboration, which in any way promote the committing of the crimes included in [the same] decree law, or the achievement of the goals of a terrorist group” commits the crime 20 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese V. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111. paragraph 178 and 179; Case De la Cruz Flores V. Peru, supra note 5, par. 105, and Case García Asto and Ramírez Rojas V. Peru. Preliminar Exception, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 254, 2005. Series C No. 137, par. 191. 21 ECHR, Scoppola V. Italy (Application No. 10249/03) September 17, 2009, par 107 and 108. 22 ECHR, Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo V. Spain (Application No. 10590/83) December 6, 1988, par. 77, and ECHR, Salabiaku V. France (Application No. 10519/83) October 7, 1988, par. 28.