- 52 reasons require this Court to examine the said arguments in this case with reference to current circumstances in the requesting State. 164. In the instant case, none of the judicial authorities that have intervened to date gave any consideration to the representative’s arguments concerning a possible risk to the personal integrity of the presumed victim. As previously determined, States have the obligation to examine all the available information in order to determine the possible situation of risk of the person who may be extradited. If, having examined the information provided, the State determines that the arguments lack adequate grounds or the necessary evidence, then it may reject the situation of risk alleged by the presumed victim. This is the second step that requires or would have required the State, and now this Court, to assess the risks alleged by the presumed victim at that time, and then, if appropriate, reject them owing to lack of adequate grounds. 165. In response to the Supreme Court’s failure to consider the human rights situation in the requesting State, the State argued that there was no law that required the judicial organ to assess this, and that the alleged context could be taken into account at the political stage of the extradition process. In this regard, the Court notes that the State has presented contradictory arguments because, on the one hand, it has affirmed that the individual subject to extradition does not have the right to be heard at the political stage (infra paras. 226 to 234) and, on the other hand, it alleges that it is at that stage that any objections to the extradition request raised by the said individual or his representative could be decided. If the right to be heard of the individual whose extradition is sought is ensured by his participation at the judicial stage of the process, then it is at that stage where any objections to his extradition based on the contextual situation of possible human rights violations in the requesting State should be decided. In this case, at the judicial stage, Wong Ho Wing raised objections concerning the human rights situation in the requesting State and the possible risk to his life or personal integrity. Consequently, the Judiciary, in this case through the Supreme Court, should have responded to these allegations, especially bearing in mind that the Supreme Court found that the extradition was in order. The Court also underlines that, according to expert witness García Toma, offered by the State, “the Council of Ministers evaluates aspects relating to the political advisability of denying the extradition,” and “if such political considerations against the extradition are uncertain […], the extradition goes forward.”219 Therefore, despite the arguments put forward by the State, it is unclear whether the alleged situation of risk to the human rights of Wong Ho Wing in the requesting State could be examined during the political stage of the extradition process. 166. Nevertheless, the Court notes that the mere failure to consider these allegations would not lead to a violation of the right to personal integrity of Wong Ho Wing, in the specific circumstances of this case. As mentioned previously, insofar as the extradition and, thus, the exposure to the alleged risk, has not happened, the Court must determine whether, in the actual circumstances, the extradition of Wong Ho Wing would result in a violation of the prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment established in Article 5 of the American Convention and the principle of non-refoulement recognized in Article 13(4) of the ICPPT. B.4.b) Alleged risk to Wong Ho Wing in the requesting State extradite, deport, expel or remove in any way a person from the territory of a State if there are sufficient reasons to believe that there is a risk of irreparable harm to his rights, and without first taking into consideration that person’s arguments concerning the existing risk. Cf. UN, Human Rights Committee, Joseph Kindler v. Canada, Communication No. 470/1991, UN Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991, November 11, 1993, para. 6.2; Charles Chitat Ng v. Canada, Communication No. 469/991, UN Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991, January 7, 1994, para. 6.2; Jonny Rubin Byahuranga v. Denmark, Communication No. 1222/2003, UN Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/1222/2003, December 9, 2004, para. 11.3; Jama Warsame v. Canada, Communication No. 1959/2010, UN Doc. CCPR/C/102/D/1959/2010, September 1, 2011, para. 8.3, and Thuraisamy v. Canada, Communication No. 1912/2009, November 2, 2012, para. 8. 219 Statement made by Víctor García Toma during the public hearing held in this case.