- 59 - 182. Expert witness Ben Saul emphasized the different nature of the diplomatic assurances provided in relation to non-application of the death penalty (a conduct that is not prohibited by international law) and those provided when there is a risk of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (a conduct that is absolutely prohibited under international law).253 In this regard, the Court takes note of the critiques and difficulties as regards the use and support of diplomatic assurances when there is a possible risk of torture.254 Nevertheless, the European Court considers that it is not for that Court to reject the possibility of their use, when they constitute a usual practice of States,255 even though their value and degree of reliability depend on the particular circumstances of the case, and the assurances offered.256 183. In this case, the Court notes that the assurances provided by the People’s Republic of China gradually changed. Initially the assurances were addressed at the risk of the application of the death penalty, while the last ones, provided in 2014, cover aspects related to the alleged risk of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (supra paras. 92 and 93). This Court recalls that, at the present time, the possibility of Wong Ho Wing being tried and sentenced to death has been eliminated (supra para. 151), so that it does not find it necessary and pertinent to analyze the sufficiency of the diplomatic assurances provided in relation to the death penalty in order to determine the current circumstances of the risk for Wong Ho Wing. The Court also recalls that it has determined that the Commission and the representative have not proved that Wong Ho Wing faces a real, foreseeable and personal risk of suffering treatment contrary to the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment if he is extradited (supra para. 176). However, in addition, it considers that the assurances provided in the eighth diplomatic note would help to eliminate any concerns about the presumed victim’s situation of risk. The last assurance provided by the People’s Republic of China was detailed and proposed a system for monitoring implementation, in keeping with several of the standards described above (supra paras. 180, 181 and 182). In this diplomatic note, the requesting State undertook to advise Peru about the possible 253 Cf. Affidavit made by Ben Saul on August 18, 2014 (evidence file, folios 6979 and 6980). 254 In this regard, the former Special Rapporteur against torture, Manfred Nowak, “called attention to the importance of maintaining the focus and remaining vigilant on practices such as the use of diplomatic assurances, which attempt to erode the absolute prohibition on torture in the context of counter-terrorism measures. He reiterates that diplomatic assurances are not legally binding and undermine existing obligations of States to prohibit torture, are ineffective and unreliable in ensuring the protection of returned persons, and therefore should not be resorted to by States. Cf. Human Rights Council discusses reports on torture, arbitrary detention and independence of judges and lawyers, September 19, 2006. Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=1384. Furthermore, in 2006, Louise Arbour, the High Commissioner for Human Rights at the time, indicated that, “[b]ased on the long experience of international monitoring bodies and experts, it is unlikely that a post-return monitoring mechanism set up explicitly to prevent torture and ill-treatment in a specific case would have the desired effect. These practices often occur in secret, with the perpetrators skilled at keeping such abuses from detection. The victims, fearing reprisal, often are reluctant to speak about their suffering, or are not believed if they do. Cf. Statement by Louise Arbour, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, to the Council of Europe Group of Specialists on Human Rights and the Fight against Terrorism (DH-S-TER), March 29 to 31, 2006. 255 In the case of Othman (Abu Qatada) v. The United Kingdom, the European Court “accepted that […] there is widespread concern within the international community as to the practice of seeking assurances to allow for the deportation of those considered to be a threat to national security. […] However, it not for this Court to rule upon the propriety of seeking assurances, or to assess the long term consequences of doing so; its only task is to examine whether the assurances obtained in a particular case are sufficient to remove any real risk of ill-treatment.” ECHR, Case of Othman (Abu Qatada) v. The United Kingdom, No. 8139/09. Judgment of January 17, 2012, para. 186. It has also indicated that: “In extradition matters, Diplomatic Notes are a standard means for the requesting State to provide any assurances which the requested State considers necessary for its consent to extradition. In Ahmad and Others, the Court also recognised that, in international relations, Diplomatic Notes carry a presumption of good faith and that, in extradition cases, it was appropriate that that presumption be applied to a requesting State which has a long history of respect for democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and which has longstanding extradition arrangements with Contracting States”. ECHR, Cases of Harkins and Edwards v. The United Kingdom, Nos. 9146/07 and 32650/07. Judgment of January 17, 2012, para. 85. 256 Cf. ECHR, Case of Othman (Abu Qatada) v. The United Kingdom, No. 8139/09. Judgment of January 17, 2012, para. 142, and Case of Rustamov v. Russia, No. 11209/10. Judgment of July 3, 2012, para. 131.