Meanwhile, the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (hereinafter “CVR”) has indicated that “the decision of [Shining Path] to initiate a so-called ‘people’s war’ against the State was the fundamental cause of the commencement of the internal armed conflict in Peru.” 59 54. According to the Final Report of the CVR in 2003, 60 the State’s agents responsible for the counter-subversive effort used the enforced disappearance of militants, and possible members or supporters of the armed groups as a control mechanism, in order to dissuade the general population from cooperating with the armed groups. 61 It is considered that, in Peru, enforced disappearance had three specific objectives: to obtain information about the insurgents or those suspected of insurgency; to eliminate subversives or supporters ensuring impunity, and to intimidate the general population and force it to side with the State authorities. 62 55. While the highest number of cases of enforced disappearance reported to the CVR during the armed conflict was recorded in 1983 and 1984 (40% of the total), between 1988 and 1993, the practice was used systematically by State agents as a counter-subversive mechanism. 63 Over this period, the Armed Forces replaced the Police Force in the tasks of internal control and countersubversive efforts in the areas declared in a state of emergency. 64 The Armed Forces are attributed with the highest percentage of victims of this practice, 65 who correspond to individuals identified by the police authorities, the military forces or the paramilitary groups as presumed members, collaborators or supporters of Shining Path or the MRTA. 66 56. According to the CVR, the modus operandi used by the authors of enforced disappearance consisted in the selection of the victim, followed by his or her arrest, location in a temporary place of detention, transfer to a detention center, interrogation, torture, elimination decision, murder, and disappearance of the remains, using the State’s resources, and it included the denial of the 29, 2006. Series C No. 162, para. 80.1 and 80.2. Also, cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume VI, Chapter 1.2 (evidence file, volume III, annex 12 to the submission of the case, folios 1502 a 1572). 59 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume II, Chapter 1(1), p. 127; Available at http://cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/. 60 In 2001, the State created the Truth and Reconciliation Commission “to clarify the process, the facts and responsibilities of the terrorist violence and of the violation of human rights that have occurred from May 1980 to November 2000, attributable to both the terrorist organizations and to State agents, as well as to propose initiatives designed to strengthen peace and harmony among Peruvians.” This Commission issued its final report on August 27, 2003, and this was submitted to the different powers of the State, which recognized its conclusions and recommendations and acted in consequence, adopting policies that reflect the high value accorded to this institutional document. Cf. Case of Baldeón García v. Peru, supra, para. 72.1, and Case of Cantoral Huamaní and García Santa Cruz v. Peru. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 10, 2007. Series C No. 167, paras. 89 and 91. 61 Cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume VI, Chapter 1.2, p. 72 (evidence file, volume III, annex 12 to the submission of the case, folio 1517). 62 Cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume VI, Chapter 1.2, p. 70 (evidence file, volume III, annex 12 to the submission of the case, folio 1515). 63 Cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume VI, Chapter 1.2, pp. 74 to 79 (evidence file, volume III, annex 12 to the submission of the case, folios 1519 to 1524). 64 Cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume VIII, General conclusions, pp. 327 and 335 (evidence file, volume III, annex 13 to the submission of the case, folios 1586 and 1594). 65 Cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume VI, Chapter 1.2, p. 81 (evidence file, volume III, annex 12 to the submission of the case, folio 1526). 66 Cf. Case of Gómez Palomino v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 54.1. 21