territory they had occupied ancestrally.591 Similarly, other subsequent laws recognized the right to collective ownership of these territories; for example, Law 70 of August 31, 1993, which recognized “to the black communities who have been occupying vacant land in the rural areas along the rivers of the Pacific Basin, in keeping with their traditional practices of production, the right to collective ownership.”592 Thus, under the protection granted by both domestic and the international law, at the time covered by the factual framework of this case, the communities of the Cacarica River basin enjoyed special protection of their right to collective ownership. The State did not contest the ownership of these rights by the Community Council of the Cacarica River basin. 348. Also, these communities are settled in a region of significant geo-strategic importance in the armed conflict, in particular for the illegal armed groups, owing to its geographical location and its biological wealth, which favors the international trafficking of arms, chemical inputs, and illegal drugs, and it is also a strategic territory from a military perspective. The illegal armed groups have sought out this region as a corridor for their movements, for trafficking arms and narcotics, and encourage the logging of native species, in order to plant coca, oil palm and banana. 349. According to Rule 7 of Customary International Humanitarian Law, “[t]he parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. Attacks may only be directed against military objectives. Attacks must not be directed against civilian objects.”593 Also, Rule 133 stipulates that “[t]he property rights of displaced persons must be respected.”594 Principle 21.3 of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Forced Displacement indicates that “[p]roperty and possessions left behind by internally displaced persons should be protected against destruction and arbitrary and illegal appropriation, occupation or use.”595 350. The Court has also found in other cases that, owing to the circumstances in which the facts occurred and, especially, owing to the socio-economic situation and vulnerability of the presumed victims, the harm caused to their property may have a greater effect and scope that it would have had for other persons or groups in other conditions.596 351. Chapter IX-1 of this Judgment established the State’s responsibility for the paramilitary incursions in the Cacarica River basin. This Court also notes that the representatives and the 591 Cf. Law 31 of July 19, 1967, approving ILO Convention 107 concerning the protection and integration of indigenous and tribal peoples in independent countries, adopted by the fourtieth session of the General Conference of the International Labour Organization. 592 Cf. Law 70 of 1993, Law 99 of 1993, and transitory article 55 of the 1991 Colombian Constitution (supra para. 131). Annex 1 of the National Council for Economic and Social Policy, CONPES 3169 of May 23, 2002, “Policy for the Afro-Colombian population,” indicates the municipalities that form the “Pacific Basin” and, in particular, includes the municipality of Riosucio, which encompasses the Cacarica River basin (evidence file, folio 45944). 593 Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits and reparations, para. 271. In addition, relevant rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law in this case are: “Rule 8. In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose partial or total destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. Rule 9. Civilian objects are all objects that are not military objectives. Rule 10. Civilian objects are protected against attack, unless and for such time as they are military objectives.” Henkaerts, Jean-Marie, Doswald Beck, Louise, Customary International Humanitarian Law, volume I, Rules, ICRC, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 29 to 36. 594 Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits and reparations, para. 272. 595 United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1997/39, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, 11 February 1998. Addendum: Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. 596 Cf. Case of Uzcátegui et al. v. Venezuela. Merits and reparations. Judgment of September 3, 2012. Series C No. 249, para. 204, and Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits and reparations, para. 273. 114