to defend themselves resulted in the violation of judicial guarantees.” It argued that Article 8(1) of the American Convention had been violated in relation to the right to be tried by a competent authority, because “at the time the victims were appointed, the only legal mechanism for their removal prior to the end of their term was an impeachment proceeding.” It considered that “it is not possible to grasp clearly how the resolution to terminate the members of the Constitutional Tribunal of November 25, 2004, could have had as its objective to rectify the illegality in the appointment of the judges, based on the application of the ‘single list’ voting mechanism, considering the time that had elapsed and the lack of other actions aimed at questioning or determining the application of this voting system,” and that “the information available indicates that the ‘single list’ voting mechanism is not expressly provided for in Ecuador’s domestic legislation, but has been used from time to time by Congress. Without prejudice to the authority of the National Congress to decide on its […] voting mechanism, the Commission is unaware of any attempted legislative, administrative or judicial actions to call into question or regulate the scope and admissibility of the ‘single list’ voting mechanism following the appointment of the members of the Constitutional Tribunal on March 19, 2003.” Based on the foregoing, the Commission concluded that “at the time of the facts of this case, the Constitution established the duration of the term for members of the Constitutional Tribunal to be one uninterrupted four-year term, and the mechanism for removing the judges from their positions, impeachment.” 124. Regarding the impeachment proceedings, the Commission indicated that “domestic law expressly prohibited the impeachment of the judges who sat on the Constitutional Tribunal based on their judgments and the opinions they express, and establishes that they may be impeached for committing ‘constitutional or statutory infractions or acts or omissions in discharging their duties characterized as infractions,’” and that “the decision to impeach the judges – almost a year and a half after the first motion of censure and in the context of the debate on the termination resolution – was politically motivated, over and above the task of oversight of infractions allegedly committed by the judges.” 125. Regarding the termination and the impeachment proceedings, the Commission argued that the alleged facts “did not constitute a possible violation of the rights recognized in Article 23(1)(c) of the American Convention.” 126. The representatives argued in relation to the termination of the judges that the “National Congress did not have competence to remove the members […] of the [Constitutional Tribunal] from office. Its competence was merely to appoint them; once [the] members had been selected […] the only way to remove them from their functions was by impeachment.” They indicated that the National Congress could hardly guarantee independence, because it was, by nature, a political organ, and “particularly when it responded, as in this case, to the interests of the Government and of parliamentary majorities,” so that “Congress did not act or guarantee the right to an independent judge, in its individual aspect.” 127. Regarding the alleged violation of Article 23 of the American Convention, the representatives argued that “the possessors of the political right to hold public office are not only those elected by the people, but [include] other ways of acceding to public office.” They added that, “in the Constitution in force at the time of the facts, the Republic of Ecuador recognized that all Ecuadorians had the right to “perform” public functions or employment,” and that their performance “should be understood as permanence in public office and that they should not be removed arbitrarily from their posts.” They argued that in the case of “judges […], they should have an enhanced guarantee as regards the exercise of their functions” and added that “stability play[ed] a dual role” because, “on the one hand, it 40