within any of the permitted circumstances; in other words, completion of the term of office or for serious disciplinary offenses (supra para. 62). In this regard, the Court observes that the main reason stated in the resolution was that “the permanent members of the Constitutional Tribunal and their alternates were appointed illegally” (supra para. 63). According to the statements of the members of Congress during the session in which the decision was taken, the irregularity in the appointment of the judges was related to the way in which the voting was conducted, by the method known as the “single list,” which they considered was not the one established by law to appoint the judges (supra para. 53). 173. During the session of November 25, 2004, the members of Congress debated the legality of the termination of the judges.198 However, this Court takes into account the State’s acquiescence in the instant proceedings, acknowledging that “the termination of the […] former judges […], [had] violated guarantees of stability and independence […] because the removal from office of the presumed victims was not based on grounds determined by law.” Indeed, in Resolution No. R-025-2005, Congress did not cite any law as the legal basis for declaring the termination; moreover, the State did not indicate on which law this decision could have been based. 174. Even though the “single-list” voting mechanism was not to be found explicitly in Ecuador’s domestic laws, no evidence was provided to the Court on any type of legislative, administrative or judicial action that was filed to contest or to regulate the scope and admissibility of the “single-list” voting mechanism, following the appoint of the members of the Constitutional Tribunal on March 19, 2003, until the time of the political crisis towards the end of 2004. If Congress considered that the appointment had been made irregularly, it should not have waited more than a year and a half to rectify this irregularity. 175. The State did not provide any information on the illegality of using the “single-list” vote under domestic law. Meanwhile, expert witness Ponce, whose opinion was not contested by the State, explained that the declaration of a possible illegality in the appointment would correspond to the contentious-administrative jurisdiction by means of an action for prejudice (acción de lesividad) [Translator’s note: action that allows the Administration to file an action against its own decisions].199 Thus, if Congress considered that the appointment was irregular, it should have had recourse to the contentiousadministrative courts for the latter to determine whether the appointment was licit. 176. Furthermore, the available evidence indicates that the only way in which it was possible to terminate the Constitutional Tribunal was by an impeachment proceeding, as established in article 275 of the 1998 Constitution (supra para. 50). In this regard, expert witness Ávila Linzán, proposed by the State, explained that article 275 of the 1998 Constitution did not “establish any kind of removal or ‘termination’ of office; however, it referred to another norm in the phrase: ‘The members of the Constitutional Tribunal shall 198 Cf. National Congress, Resolution No. R-25-160 of November 25, 2004 (file of annexes to the report, tome I, folios 347 to 405). 199 Expert witness Ponce Villacís explained that “[t]he mechanism that the National Congress should have used was the so-called action for prejudice (acción de lesividad) established in article 23 of the Law of the Contentious Administrative Jurisdiction […]. It is evident that if the National Congress considered that its decision appointing the members of the Constitutional Tribunal was illegal, it should have had recourse to the contentious administrative system of justice, so that this could determine whether the annulment of the appointment was legal; evidently, in the understanding that the appointment of members of the Constitutional Tribunal, which is a constitutional attribute, is clearly an administrative decision, because it is obviously not a legislative decision. Clearly, only the National Congress had the power to file this action because it had adopted the decision appointing the members of the Constitutional Tribunal.” Affidavit prepared by expert witness Alejandro Ponce Villacís on March 13, 2013 (merits file, tome III, folio 1351). 51