about when and how the re-opening of a vote in a parliamentary entity should be carried out, the Court finds it necessary to underline that, in an impeachment proceeding, there must be clarity as to when it starts and when it ends. 186. In this case, the information provided to the Court only allows it to conclude that the vote conducted on December 8, 2004, re-opened an impeachment proceeding that had already been finalized. Indeed, on December 2, 2004, the Secretariat of the Congress issued an explicit certification214 in which it indicated that it had not been approved and that it had been declared that the motions of censure had been rejected. Consequently, it can be affirmed that, according to domestic law, the procedural requirements had been met to consider that the impeachment proceeding had ended. Subsequently, a call to special sessions was used to re-open the vote, even though it had already been held. Consequently, this re-opening of the vote signified a new proceeding and the violation of the guarantee of “ne bis in idem.” 187. Furthermore, since a new proceeding was held, the obligation arose to hear the presumed victims as pertinent. In this regard, the Court notes that the judges were not notified about the session of December 8, 2004, in which it was decided to hold a second vote on the motions of censure (supra para. 90). Consequently, the judges had no opportunity to intervene in the proceeding on December 8, 2004, to have their arguments heard on the legality of this session and, specifically, on the legality of holding a second vote on the motions, or to exercise their right of defense and, thereby, to be able to influence a vote that signified their removal. 3. 3.1. Judicial independence General standards of judicial independence 188. In this section, the Court will summarize its case law on the principle of judicial independence. The Court’s case law has indicated that the scope of real judicial guarantees and of judicial protection for judges must be examined in relation to the standards of judicial independence. In the case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, the Court stipulated that judges, contrary to other public officials, have specific guarantees owing to the necessary independence of the Judiciary, which the Court has understood to be “essential for the exercise of the judicial function.”215 The Court reiterated that one of the main objectives of the separation of the public powers is to guarantee the independence of judges. 216 The objective of protection stems from the need to avoid the judicial system, in general, and its members, in particular, being subjected to possible undue constraints in the exercise of their function by organs outside the Judiciary or even by those judges who exercise review or appeal functions.217 According to the case law of this Court and of the European Court of Human Rights, as well as according to the United Nations Basic Principles on the 214 Cf. National Congress, Certification of the Secretary General of the National Congress issued on December 2, 2004, Note No. 371-HAV-CN-2004 (file of annexes to the report, tome II, folio 647). 215 Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 30, 2009. Series C No. 197, para. 67, citing Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 2, 2004. Series C No. 107, para. 171, and Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Series C No. 135, para. 145. 216 Cf. Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru, para. 73, and Case of Atala Riffo and daughters v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 24, 2012. Series C No. 239, para. 186. 217 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Contentious Administrative Court”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No. 182, para. 55, and Case of Atala Riffo and daughters v. Chile, para. 186. 55