4.2. Alleged confusion of sexual roles 123. With regard to the possible confusion of roles that could affect the three girls due to their living with their mother and her partner, the Supreme Court based its decision on: i) “the testimony of persons close to the girls, such as the house maids, who refer to games and attitudes of the girls that reflect confusion about the sexuality of the mother, which they could have perceived in the new cohabitation arrangements at their home,” and ii) “apart from the effects that this cohabitation could have on the well-being and psychological and emotional development of the daughters, given their ages, the potential confusion over sexual roles that could be caused by the absence from the home of a male father and his replacement by another person of the female gender poses a risk to the integral development of the children from which they must be protected” 142. 124. As regards the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation, any restriction of a right would need to be based on rigorous and weighty reasons 143. Furthermore, the burden of proof would be inverted, which means that it is up to the authority to prove that its decision does not have a discriminatory purpose or effect 144. This is especially pertinent in a case such as this, bearing in mind that the determination of harm must be supported by technical evidence and reports from experts and researchers in order to reach conclusions that do not result in discriminatory decisions. 125. Indeed, the burden of proof here falls on the State, which must demonstrate that the judicial decision under consideration has been based on the existence of clear, specific and real harm to the children’s development. Thus, the judicial decisions on such matters would need to define in a specific and concrete manner the connections and causality between the behavior and the alleged impact on the child’s development. Otherwise, there is a risk of basing the decision on stereotypes (supra paras. 109 and 111) exclusively associated with the unfounded preconception that children raised by homosexual couples would necessarily have difficulties in defining gender or sexual roles. 126. The case law of some countries, as well as many scientific reports, have clearly referred to this matter. For example, the Supreme Court of Justice of Mexico, in a 2010 142 Judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of Chile, May 31 2004 (record of appendices to the petition, volume V, page 2672). 143 Cf. ECHR, Karner V. Austria, (No. 40016/98), Judgment of July 24, 2003. Final, October 24, 2003, para. 37 (“very weighty reasons would have to be put forward before the Court could regard a difference in treatment based exclusively on the ground of sex as compatible with the Convention”), and ECHR, Case of Kozak, supra note ¡Error! Marcador no definido., para. 92. 144 Cf. ECHR, Case E.B, supra note ¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia., para. 74 (The Court observes, moreover, that the Government, on whom the burden of proof lay […], were unable to produce statistical information on the frequency of reliance on that ground according to the – declared or known – sexual orientation of the persons applying for adoption, which alone could provide an accurate picture of administrative practice and establish the absence of discrimination when relying on that ground); Case D.H. et al. V. Czech Republic, (No. 57325/00), Judgment of November 13, 2007, para. 177 (As to the burden of proof in this sphere, the Court has established that once the applicant has shown a difference in treatment, it is for the Government to show that it was justified); Case of Orsus et al. v. Croatia, (No. 15766/03), Judgment of March 16, 2010, para. 150 (discrimination potentially contrary to the Convention may result from a of facto situation. Where an applicant produces prima facie evidence that the effect of a measure or practice is discriminatory, the burden of proof will shift on to the respondent State, to whom it falls to show that the difference in treatment is not discriminatory); Case of Andrejeva v. Latvia, (No. 55707/00), Judgment of February 18, 2009, para. 84 (Lastly, as to the burden of proof in relation to Article 14 of the Convention, the Court has held that once the applicant has shown a difference in treatment, it is for the Government to show that it was justified); Case of Serife Yigit v. Turkey, (No. 3976/05), Judgment of November 2, 2010, para. 71 (As to the burden of proof in this sphere, the Court has established that once the applicant has shown a difference in treatment, it is for the Government to show that it was justified), and Case of Muñoz Díaz v. Spain, (No. 49151/07), Judgment of March 8, 2010, para. 50. 42