legitimate goal and comply with the requirements of suitability, necessity proportionality, in other words, they must be necessary in a democratic society181. and 165. In this regard the Court emphasizes that Ms. Atala’s sexual orientation is part of her private life, and therefore any interference in it must meet the standards of “suitability, necessity, and proportionality.” This differs from the context of a custody proceeding, where specific parental behaviors that have allegedly caused damage to the child may be analyzed (supra paras. 109 and 111). 166. Given that the domestic courts gave importance to the issue of Ms. Atala’s sexual orientation in the custody decision, they exposed different aspects of her private life throughout the proceedings. The Court notes that the reason given by the courts for interfering in Ms. Atala’s private life was the same one used to justify the discriminatory treatment (supra para.107), namely, the alleged best interest of the three girls. The Court considers that, although that principle is related in abstracto to a legitimate goal (supra para.110), the measure was unsuitable and disproportionate to achieve that purpose, since the domestic courts should have limited themselves to examining parental behavior– which could be part of their private life – but without exposing and scrutinizing Ms. Atala’s sexual orientation. 167. The Court finds that during the custody proceeding, based on a stereotyped vision on the scope of Ms. Atala’s sexual orientation (supra para. 146), there was arbitrary interference in her private life, given that sexual orientation is part of a person’s intimacy and is not relevant when examining aspects related to an individual’s suitability as a parent. Therefore, the Court concludes that the State violated Article 11.2, in conjunction with Article 1.1 of the American Convention, to the detriment of Karen Atala Riffo. 168. Furthermore, the Court notes that one of the central arguments considered in the judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice and the decision of the Juvenile Court of Villarica in the provisional custody proceeding, was Ms. Atala’s cohabitation with her lesbian partner (supra paras. ¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia. and ¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia.). Accordingly, this Court considers it essential to examine the alleged violation of the right to family life alleged by the Commission and the representatives. 169. In this regard, the Court reiterates that Article 11. 2 of the American Convention is closely linked to the right to protection of the family and to live in a family, recognized in Article 17 of the Convention, which requires the State not only to provide and directly implement measures of protection for children, but also to favor, in the broadest possible terms, the development and strength of the family unit182. The Court has established that, under certain conditions, the separation of children from their family constitutes a violation of said right183, since even legal separations of a child from his family may only proceed if these are duly justified184. 181 Cf. Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment January 27, 2009. Series C No.193, para. 56 and Case of Escher et al. v. Brazil. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 6, 2009. Series C No. 200, para. 116. 182 Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-17/02, supra note 122, para. 66 and Case Chitay Nech et al., supra note ¡Error! Marcador no definido., para. 157. 183 Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-17/02, supra note 122, paras. 71 and 72 and Case Chitay Nech et al., supra note ¡Error! Marcador no definido., para. 157. 184 Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-17/02, supra note 122, para. 77. 53