protected by the Convention281. In other words, the States not only have the positive obligation to adopt the legislative measures necessary to guarantee the exercise of the rights enshrined therein, but they must also avoid promulgating laws that may impede the free exercise of these rights, as well as preventing the amendment or suppression of any laws which protect those rights282. 280. In the case at hand, the Court limited itself to examining the relationship between the legal application of certain laws with possible discriminatory practices. The Court did not analyze the compatibility of a particular law with the American Convention, nor was this matter pertinent to the case. Also, the representatives did not provide sufficient facts that would suggest that the violations resulted from a problem with the laws per se. Therefore, the Court considers that it is not appropriate, in the circumstances of the present case, to order the adoption, modification or adjustment of specific domestic laws. 281. Furthermore, as previously established in its case law, this Court recalls that it is cognizant that the State authorities are subject to the rule of law and, therefore, are required to apply the provisions in force in their legal system.283 But when a State is Party to an international agreement such as the American Convention, all its organs, including its judges and all other entities linked to the administration of justice, are also subject to it. This obliges them to remain vigilant and to ensure that the effects of the Convention’s provisions are not impaired by the application of other laws contrary to its purpose and aim. 282. The judges and entities engaged in the administration of justice at all levels are required to undertake “Convention control” ex officio between domestic law and the American Convention in the context of their respective competencies and the corresponding procedural regulations. In this task, the judges and other organs of the justice system must take into account not only the Convention, but also the interpretation thereof by the InterAmerican Court, in its role as the final authority on the interpretation of the American Convention284. 283. Thus, for example, the region’s highest Courts, such as the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica,285 the Constitutional Court of Bolivia,286 the Supreme Court of Justice of the Dominican Republic,287 the Constitutional Court of Peru,288 the 281 Cf. Case Gangaram Panday v. Suriname. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of December 4, 1991. Series C No. 12, para. 50 and Case Chocrón Chocrón, supra note 26, para. 1 282 Cf. Case Gangaram Panday, supra note 281, para. 50 and Case Chocrón Chocrón, supra note 26, para. 1 283 Cf. Case of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 26, 2006. Series C No. 154, para. 124 and Case of Fontevecchia and D`Amico, supra note 28, para. 93. 284 Cf. Case Almonacid Arellano et al., supra note ¡Error! Marcador no definido., para. 124 and Case Fontevecchia and D`Amico, supra note 28, para. 93. 285 Cf. Judgment of May 9, 1995 issued by the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica. Held unconstitutional. Vote 2313-95 (File 0421-S-90), considering clause VII. 286 Cf. Judgment issued on May 10, 2010 by the Constitutional Court of Bolivia (File No. 2006-13381-27RAC), para. III.3 on “The Inter-American System of Human Rights. Basis and effects of the Judgments issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.” 287 Cf. Order No. 1920-2003 issued on November 13, 2003 by the Supreme Court of the Dominican Republic. Judgment issued on July 21, 2006 by the Constitutional Court of Peru (File No. 2730-2006-PA/TC), consideration 12 and judgment 00007-2007-PI/TC issued on June 19, 2007 by the plenary of the Constitutional Court of Peru (Callao College of Lawyers, Congress of the Republic), consideration 26. 288 80