foregoing considerations and their cumulative effects, the Court holds that the conditions of the applicant’s detention in view of his physical disability and, in particular, his inability to have access to various prison facilities independently, including the sanitation facilities, and that in such a situation the lack of any organized assistance with his mobility around the prison or his daily routine, reached the threshold of severity required to constitute degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. There has, accordingly, been a violation of that provision.20 21. In addition to the foregoing, in the Case of X v. Argentina, the author suffered a stroke which resulted in left homonymous hemianopia, a sensory balance disorder, a cognitive disorder and impaired visuospatial orientation,21 a serious neurological disease that meant he required assistance to perform the most basic daily tasks. Notwithstanding the pronouncements on accessibility and reasonable accommodation22 in relation to the services provided to the victim by the nurse, the RPD Committee took note of the observations made in situ by the State authorities and confirmed the existence and operation of a call button to summon the nurse, who provided assistance 24 hours a day. In response, the Committee indicated that there was no doubt that the author required health care23 and, although a call button was installed, the author said that in practice, it took some time before someone responded,24 yet the Committee did not comment on the failure to comply with this obligation. It took a different view regarding the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation in other conditions of detention, since it concluded that the State of Argentina “[had] not irrefutably demonstrated that the accommodations made in the prison complex [were] sufficient to ensure the author’s independent (insofar as possible) access to the bathroom and shower, recreation yard and nursing service.”25 In other words, the RPD Committee has not denied that, in certain cases, States must provide assistance to persons with severe disabilities when they are deprived of their liberty and, therefore, that this violates the principle of independence. On the contrary, in the case of X, the fact that the Committee pointed out that the State should have adapted the complex to ensure access to the nursing service not only entailed the provision and operation of the call button, but also ensuring timely assistance and attention within the detention center. 20 Cf. ECHR, Case of Grimailovs v. Latvia, No. 6087/03, Judgment of June 25, 2013, para. 162. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Communication No. 8/2012, X v. Argentina, CRPD/C/11/D/8/2012, April 11, 2014, para. 2.1. 21 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Communication No. 8/2012, X v. Argentina, CRPD/C/11/D/8/2012, April 11, 2014, para. 9 a) and b). 22 Cf. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Communication No. 8/2012, X v. Argentina, CRPD/C/11/D/8/2012, April 11, 2014, para. 8.10. 23 Cf. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Communication No. 8/2012, X v. Argentina, CRPD/C/11/D/8/2012, April 11, 2014, paras. 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6. 24 .25 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Communication No. 8/2012, X v. Argentina, CRPD/C/11/D/8/2012, April 11, 2014, para. 8.5. 8