sentences and all matters relating thereto” (Articles 43 and 51 of the Code). The judges are responsible for “maintaining the legality of the enforcement of sentences and safeguarding the rights of those sentenced to a prison term against abuses of the administration” and, among other functions, may “decide, after hearing the interested parties, on incidental motions related to enforcement, the extinction of sentences, early release and any other important actions deemed necessary by the judge.” These motions “shall be decided at an oral public hearing, summoning the required witnesses and experts to testify during that hearing.” Furthermore, such judges are competent to rule on matters such as conditional release, “monitoring compliance with the conditions imposed,” and “supervising proper compliance by the prison system.” The State also indicated that, when ruling on motions and petitions, said judges must issue their decisions in full observance of the relevant legal and regulatory provisions according to the requests or motions filed, in order to uphold the legality of the enforcement of prison sentences, always bearing in mind the rights of convicted persons. 240. As to first aspect, it is clear that the Second Criminal Enforcement Court had the power to grant the alleged victim, as a person deprived of liberty for committing a crime, authorization to leave the COF, at her request or at the request of the prison authorities, whenever she needed medical care at public hospitals. In response to such requests, and before granting permission, the judge could require a medical examiner to issue an opinion based on an evaluation, or require the social information service to verify the existence of programed appointments (supra para. 44). As emphasized by the State, the great majority of these requests were granted (supra para. 197), even though the judge, unaware that the nature of Mrs. Chinchilla’s illnesses meant she might require immediate attention, warned on one occasion that in future any request must be submitted “at least eight days in advance” otherwise, it would be denied; or even though on one occasion (in 2003) the judge ordered that Mrs. Chinchilla be given “symptomatic” treatment, without ensuring proper follow-up. Thus, while it is possible to consider that the enforcement judge was aware of the alleged victim´s health condition when he ruled on her petitions, the Court considers that there are not sufficient elements to conclude that the State was responsible, under Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention, in relation to the specific judicial actions or procedures for granting permission to leave the COF. 241. As to the second aspect, the record shows that the Second Criminal Enforcement Court considered and ruled on four incidental motions for early release for “extraordinary remission of sentences” or “for terminal illness,” filed by Mrs. Chinchilla between November 2002 and May 2004. In the context of those incidental motions, the judge received consistent and regular information on Mrs. Chinchilla’s health condition and its impact on her life and wellbeing through the certifications, communications and technical-medical information that were provided to him. In particular, it was demonstrated that the judge received clear and repeated information regarding the lack of capacity at the COF (in terms of qualified staff, sufficient equipment and supplies) to provide adequate treatment to the alleged victim, through a series of reports submitted by the COF duty doctors, the prison´s “multidisciplinary team” and the medical examiners designated as expert witnesses, which revealed a clear and progressive deterioration in her health during the last two years of her life. 242. The Court has reiterated that when a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention, all its bodies, including its judges, are bound by it. This requires them to ensure that the effects of the provisions embodied in the Convention are not adversely affected by the enforcement of laws that are contrary to its purpose. Therefore, the judges and all bodies associated with the administration of justice at all levels must exercise “conventionality control” ex officio, between domestic legal provisions and those of the American Convention, obviously in the context of their respective competences and of the 76