corresponding procedural rules. In doing so, the Judiciary should not only take into account the treaty, but also its interpretation by the Inter-American Court, which is the ultimate interpreter of the American Convention.339 243. With regard to this case, and in relation to the powers of the enforcement judges, it is clear that they were required to rule on any motions filed during the enforcement of the sentence, being responsible for monitoring its implementation, overseeing its legality “and everything related thereto,” as well as protecting the rights of prisoners “from abuses by the administration” and “monitoring appropriate compliance by the prison system.” In particular, among other tasks, they ruled on motions concerning execution of the sentence, early release and “any other important actions deemed necessary by the judge,” “always taking into account the rights of prisoners.” Thus, there is no doubt that, in the exercise of conventionality control, and in the absence of mechanisms for external supervision and monitoring of the health services specifically in the COF, 340 within the context of their powers (supra para. 239) and given the information received through the aforementioned motions for early release, the judge of enforcement was in a position - and had the obligation - to ensure judicial protection with due guarantees to the alleged victim, in relation to the deterioration of her health and her disability, and particularly the failings in the medical treatment that was and could be provided at the COF. 244. Having regard to the aforementioned criteria for the protection of the rights to life and personal integrity of persons deprived of liberty, the Court considers that in response to such petitions, judges must weigh up the interest of the State in ensuring the enforcement of a validly imposed criminal penalty, with the need to assess the viability of continuing to incarcerate convicted persons who suffer from certain serious illnesses. In other words, when the health pathology is incompatible with deprivation of liberty, or when incarceration cannot provide an appropriate mechanism for the exercise of basic human rights, it is necessary to try to ensure that prison reduces and mitigates the harm caused to the person and provides the most humane treatment possible according to international standards. Thus, if there is any danger to life or personal integrity and incarceration does not permit an individual to exercise his basic rights, according to the circumstances of the case, the judges must consider what other alternative or substitute measures for imprisonment are available, 341 without this Cf. Case of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 26, 2006. Series C No. 154, para. 124; Case of Gomes Lund et al. (Guerrilha do Araguaia) v. Brazil, supra, para. 176, and Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 26, 2010. Series C No. 220, para. 225. Also see Case of Gelman v. Uruguay. Merits and reparations. Judgment of February 24, 2011 Series C No. 221, para. 193; Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, supra, para. 144; and Case of Expelled Dominicans and Haitians v. Dominican Republic, supra, para. 311. 339 In response to a question of the Judges, the State explained that “a specific external mechanism for the supervision or monitoring of the health service did not exist. However, at the time of the facts, the body charged with supervising prison services was the Central Prisons Board, as established in the Remission of Sentences Law in force at the time.” With regard to the last incidental motion filed, in April 2004, the Court notes that the judge of the First Criminal Enforcement Court sent a communication to the Second Enforcement Judge informing him that “the Central Prison Board ha[d] been disbanded since 2002 on account of the duplication of functions between the Judge of the First Criminal Enforcement Court and the President of the Board,” for which reason “it [was] not possible to issue a ruling on the motion filed for early release through remission of sentences.” 340 See the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, (Nelson Mandela Rules) approved by the United Nations General Assembly on December 17, 2015. Explanatory note: “Recalling resolution 69/172, of December 18, 2014, entitled “Human Rights in the Administration of Justice,” which recognized the importance of the principle that, except for those lawful limitations that are demonstrably necessitated by the fact of incarceration, persons deprived of their liberty shall retain their non-derogable human rights and all other human rights and fundamental freedoms, and recalled that the social rehabilitation and reintegration of persons deprived of their liberty shall be among the essential aims of the criminal justice system, ensuring, as far as possible, that offenders are able to lead a law-abiding and self-supporting life upon their return to society, and took notes of, inter alia, General Comment No. 21, on the humane treatment of persons deprived of their liberty, adopted by the Human 341 77