248. For this Court, a clear explanation of a decision constitutes an essential part of a correct justification of a judicial decision, understood as “a reasoned justification that allows a conclusion to be reached.”342 In this sense, the Court has stated that the obligation to justify decisions is a guarantee linked to the proper administration of justice, which gives credibility to judicial decisions adopted within the framework of a democratic society. 343 Therefore, the decisions adopted by national bodies that could affect human rights must be duly justified, because otherwise they would be arbitrary decisions. 344 In that sense, the reasons given for a judgment and for certain administrative acts must disclose the facts, reasons and norms upon which the authority based its decision. 345 Moreover, it must show that the arguments of the parties have been duly weighed and that the body of evidence has been analyzed. Therefore, the duty to state grounds is one of the “due guarantees” included in Article 8(1) to safeguard the right to due process,346 not only of the defendant but also, in the instant case, of the person deprived of liberty in relation to the right to access justice. 249. In this case, the Court does not rule on the decision, per se, not to grant the early release as requested in the incidental motions filed, which were decided after analyzing a series of evidentiary elements of a technical-professional nature and medical opinions. However, in considering the actual grounds for the decision, the Court finds that the actions of the enforcement judge were limited to establishing whether or not Mrs. Chinchilla suffered from a terminal illness to determine if early release was appropriate or not. In this sense, the rulings do not reflect adequate grounds for the decisions, particularly in assessing or weighing elements such as the nature and risks of her disease or disability and the proper treatment due. This, in spite of the fact that several conflicting opinions of a technical and medical nature, and of other disciplines, were provided regarding the terminal nature of her disease and of the COF’s real capacity to provide her with proper treatment, both on a regular basis and in an emergency. The judge also had access to the opinions of the prison doctor and the Multidisciplinary Team of the COF, which expressly mentioned the institution’s inability to ensure her treatment and the need to grant her early release. 250. Thus, the technical criteria indicated, on the one hand, that Mrs. Chinchilla´s disease could be treated in an ambulatory manner (that is, within the COF) as long as proper treatment was assured and, on the other, that it was a terminal illness or that was not clear whether the COF could provide such treatment. For example, in the first incidental motion, the medical examiner referred to “symptoms of terminal illness” and, although the doctors of the HSJD, the COF and the Public Prosecution Service all agreed that diabetes per se is not a Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 21, 2007. Series C No. 170, para. 107; and Case of García Ibarra et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 151. 342 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No. 182, para. 77; and Case of García Ibarra et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 151. This was also established by the European Court in the case Suominen: “Cf. ECHR, Suominen v. Finland, No. 37801/97, of July 1, 2003, para. 34 [the European Court] then reiterates that, according to its established case law reflecting a principle linked to the proper administration of justice, judgments of courts and tribunals should adequately state the reasons on which they are based.” Cf. ECHR, Suominen v. Finland, No. 37801/97, of July 1, 2003, para. 34. 343 Cf. Case of Yatama v. Nicaragua, Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 23, 2005. Series C No. 127, paras. 152 and 153; and Case of García Ibarra et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 151. Likewise, the European Court has indicated that judges must clearly indicate the reasons for which they take their decisions. Cf. ECHR, Hadjianastassiou v. Greece, No. 12945/87, Judgment of December 16, 1992, para. 23. 344 Cf. Case of Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 19, 2006. Series C No. 151, para. 122; and Case of García Ibarra et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 151. 345 Cf. Case of López Mendoza v. Venezuela, supra, para. 141, and Case of García Ibarra et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 151. 346 79