defamation in force at the time, and defined in article 110 of the Criminal Code of the Nation. This article established that “[a]nyone who dishonors or discredits another person shall be punished by a fine of one thousand pesos to ninety thousand pesos or imprisonment from one month to one year.” 248 133. The Court notes that, contrary to the argument of the Commission, in the Kimel case, this Court did not consider that, in general, the offenses of libel and defamation were incompatible with the American Convention. As the Court has reiterated in its consistent case law, punishment for the expression of information or opinions is not considered contrary to the Convention (supra para. 126). In the Kimel case, the Court ruled specifically on articles 109 and 110 of the Criminal Code in force at the time, establishing that they did not meet the standards of strict legality required in criminal matters 249 owing to “the lack of sufficient precision in the criminal laws that penalize libel and defamation,” which, moreover, had been acknowledged by the State itself. 250 It is on this basis that the Inter-American Court established, specifically, that this “lack of precision” should be rectified. 251 When Argentina corrected the said lack of precision, by Law 26,551 of November 2009, amending the definitions that existed in the Criminal Code, the Inter-American Court determined that the State had complied fully with its obligation to adapt its domestic law to the American Convention. 252 134. According to the information in the case file, the Court notes that Messrs. Mémoli were convicted based on a norm established in the Argentine legal system designed to protect a legitimate objective compatible with the Convention: the protection of the honor and reputation of others (supra para. 126). The Court’s considerations in the Kimel case on the substantive legality of the norm that defined libel as an offense in the Argentine legal system are not applicable to this case, 253 owing to a difference in the factual and legal nature of the case. 135. The criminal proceedings against Eduardo Kimel in Argentina was based on an analysis he made in his 1998 book entitled “La masacre de San Patricio” 254 of the murder of five Pallotine Fathers, which occurred in Argentina on July 4, 1976, during the last military dictatorship. 255 In this book, Mr. Kimel examined, inter alia, the judicial measures taken to investigate the massacre. With regard to a judicial decision adopted on October 7, 1977, Mr. 248 Report of the Centro de Estudios Legales and Sociales (CELS) on the Kimel case (file of annexes to the final written arguments of the representatives, folio 3554); Merits Report of the Commission (merits file, folio 22), and pleadings and motions brief of the representatives (merits file, folio 93). Despite the Court’s request, none of the parties provided a copy of the Criminal Code in force at the time of the sentence imposed on Messrs. Mémoli (supra para. 8 and footnotes 7 and 127). 249 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina, supra, paras. 63 to 67. 250 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina, supra, paras. 66 and 67. 251 Case of Kimel v. Argentina, supra, para. 128. 252 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Monitoring compliance with judgment. Decision of the Court of May 18, 2010, Considering paragraph 35. Law 26,551 of 2009 amended the definition and sanction of the offense of defamation of which Messrs. Mémoli were convicted, so that: (i) the requirement of fraud for the perpetration of the offense was expressly included; (ii) the possibility was eliminated that statements related to matters of public interest or those that were not affirmative could constitute presumptions of defamation; (iii) the possibility was eliminated that “expressions that harmed honor” could constitute the offense of libel “when related to a matter of public interest,” and (iv) the punishment of imprisonment was eliminated for the perpetration of this offense. 253 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina, supra, paras. 61 to 67. 254 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina, supra, para. 41. 255 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina, supra, para. 41. 53