And, based on the provisions of the latter article, neither was the purpose of this case to determine whether the competent domestic courts could subsequently impose liability or penalties on Messrs. Mémoli for their exercise of the right to freedom of thought and expression, 375 but rather if this were necessary, in the Court’s opinion and in keeping with the Convention, in order to ensure respect for the rights or reputation of the complainants. In other words, the purpose of these proceedings was not to determine whether the subsequent imposition of liability for the exercise of the right to freedom of thought and expression was established in the law of the State – this does not form part of the litis, it was not disputed; but rather whether the liability or penalties established by the State’s system of justice in this case was necessary to ensure respect for the rights or the reputation of the complainants in the domestic proceeding. If this case is not envisaged in this way, it would be sufficient that the subsequent imposition of liability for the exercise of freedom of thought and expression was explicitly established by law and that the right to the protection of the law was exercised against unlawful attacks on honor and reputation established in Article 11 of the Convention, for the Court to have to declare that the provisions of Article 13 of the Convention had not been violated, even if the need for liability decreed by the State’s courts in the pertinent proceeding, as established by this article, had not been proved which, doubtless, would be absurd. For the same reason, in these proceedings, the Court is not acting as a fourth instance in this regard, 376 by either ratifying or substituting or annulling the corresponding decision of the domestic courts. 377 Its responsibility was to determine whether that decision was in keeping with the provisions of the Convention or, to the contrary, violated its provisions - thus having no international legal effects – and, in that eventuality, it was for the Court to establish that the State should adopt the pertinent measures that it indicated in order to cease incurring international responsibility. C. Weighing up of the need for the liability or sanctions imposed by the domestic court 1. Failure to weigh up In the instant case, the Court itself, pursuant to the Convention, should have weighed up, or made an proportionality assessment between, the said exercise of the right to freedom of thought and expression and the need for the subsequent imposition of liability or sanctions decided by the domestic judge owing to the statements made under the protection of this right. But, this course of action was not taken in the Judgment. To the contrary, the Court opted for the view that it was the State’s domestic jurisdiction that had competence to examine the corresponding facts; that this jurisdiction was “in a better position to assess which rights had been harmed most” and, hence, the decision adopted by the State’s jurisdiction that the said statements constituted defamation was assessed and accepted as valid. 378 Consequently, the Court found that the analysis made by the State’s domestic jurisdiction was a “reasonable and sufficient weighing up of the two rights in conflict.” 379 375 Paras. 114 to 116 of the Judgment. 376 Para. 140 of the Judgment. 377 Idem. 378 Paras. 141 to 144 of the Judgment. 379 Para. 143 of the Judgment. 5