which the complaint was filed, as well as for the offense of libel, and (iv) when acquitting them for these statements, the domestic courts distinguished that some of these statements constituted opinions or were of a hypothetical nature in order to exempt them from criminal liability for the offense of libel and defamation, 263 or constituted “accounts of facts or “newspaper stories.” 264 142. The Court also notes that the presumed victims alleged the need for protection of their freedom of expression before the domestic courts and, in both instances, it was not considered that this was sufficient justification for the harm verified to the complainants’ reputation (supra paras. 83 and 87). The Court recalls that freedom of expression is not an absolute right and that it may be subject to the subsequent imposition of liability based on the protection of the rights of others; in this case, the right to honor and reputation of the complainants (supra paras. 123, 126 and 127). Thus, the Court takes note of the findings of the domestic judicial authorities according to which “freedom of the press is not an absolute right, but must coexist, in harmony, with the other rights guaranteed to the citizens.” 265 Similarly, the Court recalls its case law, according to which both rights of the Convention deserve equal protection and must coexist harmoniously (supra para. 127). The Court reiterates that, in this harmonization process, the State must establish the responsibilities and penalties that may be necessary to achieve this objective (supra paras. 125 and 127). 143. In this regard, the Court takes note that the Argentine judicial authorities who intervened in this case examined the statements made by Messrs. Mémoli and their impact on the honor and reputation of third parties. In this Court’s opinion, this examination constituted a reasonable and sufficient weighing up of the two rights in conflict, which justified the subsequent imposition of liability against them. Given the nature of the proceedings before this Court, private individuals whose honor and reputation have been harmed have not taken part in them. Consequently, this Court considers that, in this case, the domestic judicial 263 See, for example, that the first instance court acquitted Messrs. Mémoli: (i) with regard to the “letters document” of April 6, 1990, considering that, since they did not contain the specific accusation of an offense (because the said document used the expression “presumed fraud”), there was no defamation, while there was no libel because Mr. Mémoli, as a member of the Italian Association, was acting “in defense of the Association’s interests and, consequently, was expressing his opinion that, ultimately, would be subject to the decision of the other members”; (ii) regarding the communiqué (solicitada) entitled “Autoritarismo e irregularidades de un miembro de una Comisión Directiva,” Carlos Mémoli was acquitted considering that he was “expressing publicly his opinion on the administration of the association” and, with regard to treasurer Piriz, “demanded compliance with a statutory obligation,” without accusing them of an offense; in general, it constituted “a criticism of the Management Committee’s administration of the association,” so that it did not constitute defamation or libel because this opinion “could not dishonor them and did not related to the actual person, in addition to not having been made with the specific malice required by the definition of the offense”; (iii) regarding Pablo Mémoli’s article entitled “Denuncian presunta defraudación,” he was acquitted, considering that “this article was written in the conditional tense, and without making a categorical reference to the criminal liability of [the complainants]”, and finding that the content of the article refers “to the essence of the information, without being able to say that it contains an accusation of an offense or an attack on the honor of or a denigration of the [complainants].” Judgment delivered by Court No. 7 for Criminal and Correctional Matters of the Judicial Department of Mercedes in case No. 71,114 on December 29, 1994 (file of annexes to the Merits Report, annex 3, folios 171, 172, 173 and 177). 264 See, for example, the considerations of the first instance court acquitting Messrs. Mémoli for the article entitled “Toman declaración a adquirientes de nichos,” published on April 28, 1990, in La Libertad, which indicates that “neither the phrase [for which the complaint was filed against them] nor the context reveal defamatory expressions, because it merely gives an account of the facts.” In addition, with regard to Pablo Mémoli’s article entitled “Caso nichos: Torpe amenaza a la libertad,” the first instance court considered that there was no animus injuriandi, because “it is merely a newspaper story and it even refers to problems in INAM and to a threat received,” that had been reported, and which had given rise to this publication and “in no way affects the complainants’ honor.” Judgment delivered by Court No. 7 for Criminal and Correctional Matters of the Judicial Department of Mercedes in case No. 71,114 on December 29, 1994 (file of annexes to the Merits Report, annex 3, folios 185, 186 and 206) 265 Judgment of Court No. 7 for Criminal and Correctional Affairs of the Judicial Department of Mercedes in case No. 71,114 on December 29, 1994 (file of annexes to the Merits Report, annex 3, folio 210). 56