according to Argentine law, “[t]he judge, to avoid unnecessary liens and prejudice to the owner of the property, may establish a precautionary measure other than the one requested, or limit it, taking into account the significance of the right that it is sought to protect.” 310 Despite this provision, the precautionary measure has been in force for more than 17 years and, according to the information in the case file provided to this Court, was re-ordered in December 2011, which presumes that it will be in effect until December 2016 (supra para. 112). 311 In brief, the prolonged duration of the proceeding, in principle of a summary nature, combined with the general injunction on property for more than 17 years, has constituted a disproportionate impairment of the right to property of Messrs. Mémoli and has resulted in the precautionary measures becoming punitive measures. 181. Regarding the State’s argument that the presumed victims could have offered “other assets to be embargoed in order to obtain the lifting of the injunction, since this is permitted by Argentine law” (supra para. 166), the Court underlines that, even if the presumed victims had been able to offer sufficient assets for the precautionary measure ordered to be substituted by another, this does not mean that the imposition of such measures for more than 17 years in this case would have been proportionate. In this regard, the delay in obtaining a final judgment in the proceeding for damages has extended the duration of the precautionary measure and has infringed the right to property of the presumed victims. 182. The Court also notes that, after their conviction in the criminal jurisdiction, the presumed victims have been subject to the threat of being convicted for the same facts in the civil sphere for more than 15 years and, consequently, to be obliged to pay all, or at least part, of the amount claimed by the plaintiffs for damages (at the time the equivalent of ninety thousand United States dollars), plus the costs of the proceeding. 183. All the foregoing reveals that the responsible judicial authorities did not act with due diligence and the obligation to ensure promptness required by the rights and interests at stake. All things considered, the Court finds that the duration, for more than 15 years, of a civil proceeding for damages of a summary nature, based on a criminal sentence for the offense of defamation, added to the fact that a general injunction to sell or encumber property was in force, exceeds excessively the duration that could be considered reasonable for the State to decide a case of this nature and has had a disproportionate effect on the right to property of Messrs. Mémoli. Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes that the State violated the principle of reasonable time established in Article 8(1) and the right to property recognized in Article 21, both in relation to Article 1(1), all of the American Convention, to the detriment of Pablo and Carlos Mémoli. * 184. In their arguments, the representatives also referred to non-compliance with certain time frames in the criminal proceeding against the presumed victims for defamation. 312 310 Decree Law 7425/69, Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure of the province of Buenos Aires, art. 204 (annexes to the representatives’ final written arguments, folio 2909, available at http://www.gob.gba.gov.ar/legislacion/legislacion/l-7425.html). 311 In this regard, the pertinent part of Article 207 of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure of the province of Buenos Aires establishes that: “[i]njunctions and embargoes shall extinguish five years after their registration in the Property Registry, unless, at the request of the party, they are re-registered before this term has expired by an order of the judge who heard the proceedings.” Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure of the province of Buenos Aires. Decree Law 7425/69, art. 207 (annexes to the representatives’ final written arguments, folio 2909, available at http://www.gob.gba.gov.ar/legislacion/legislacion/l-7425.html). 312 In this regard, the representatives indicated that “the criminal judge of first instance took one year to deliver judgment. Exactly the same occurred with the Criminal Chamber, the Provincial Court, and the National Court.” 69