[because t]hey violated the law in different ways,” and also Article 24 of the Convention, owing to the supposed partiality of the judges who have heard the case in the criminal and civil jurisdictions. 188. The State considered that “the presumed victims ha[d] not provided any arguments additional to those already analyzed by the Commission in its Merits Report that would permit proving the alleged violation of due process [in relation to the establishment of the new hearing in the criminal proceeding].” In addition, it indicated that “the presumed victims did not explain how Article 25 had been violated.” In this regard, it indicated that “the disciplinary offenses of the judges who intervened in the civil case were fully decided by the domestic courts and, consequently, since no irregularity in that disciplinary proceeding has been argued, the allegation of Article 25 should be rejected based on the legal doctrine of the “fourth instance.” The State also indicated that the arguments of the representatives concerning the supposed violation of Article 24 of the Convention were insufficient and unsubstantiated by any kind of evidence. B.2) Considerations of the Court 189. The Court notes that the representatives, in addition to the violation of the reasonable time, argued the violation of due process owing to: (i) the establishment of a second hearing in the criminal proceeding; (ii) the payment that the presumed victims supposedly had to make following the inadmissibility of the remedy of complaint; (iii) the alleged prescription of the civil action; (iv) the loss of evidence in the civil proceeding, and (v) the alleged violations of Articles 24 and 25 of the Convention. The Court will examine each of these arguments in this section and in this order. 190. First, the Court reiterates that the representatives of the presumed victims may cite the violation of rights other than those alleged by the Commission (supra para. 153). In this regard, it deems it pertinent to recall that in cases such as this one, in which actions in the context of judicial proceedings are questioned, the organs of the inter-American human rights system do not act as a court of appeal or for review of the judgments handed down in the domestic proceedings, 315 nor does it act as a criminal court in which the criminal responsibilities of the individual can be analyzed. 316 Its function is to determine the compatibility of the actions carried out in the said proceedings with the American Convention 317 and, in particular, to examine the acts and omissions of the domestic judicial organs in light of the guarantees protected in Article 8 of this instrument. 318 Hence, the Court is not a higher court or a court of appeal to decide the disagreements between the parties concerning specific implications of the application of domestic law on aspects that are not directly related to compliance with international human rights obligations. On this basis, this Court has maintained that, in principle, “it is for the State’s courts to examine the facts and evidence presented in each specific case.” 319 315 Cf. Case of Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala, supra. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 20, 2005. Series C No. 126, para. 62, and Case of Mohamed v. Argentina, supra, para. 81. 316 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits, supra, para. 134, and Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, supra, para. 162. 317 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Preliminary objections. Judgment of September 4, 1998. Series C No. 41, para. 83, and Case of Mohamed v. Argentina, supra, paras. 79 and 81. 318 Cf. Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of November 19, 1999. Series C No. 63, para. 220, and Case of Mohamed v. Argentina, supra, para. 81. 319 Case of Nogueira de Carvalho et al. v. Brazil, supra, para. 80, and Case of Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 24, 2012. Series C No. 239, para. 65. 71