had significant consequences for it”; 385 “that Article 13 of the Convention protects statements, ideas or information ‘of all kinds,’ whether or not they are of public interest”; that “[n]evertheless, when such statements refer to issues of public interest, the judge must assess the need to limit freedom of expression with special care,” 386 and that the different threshold for protection of honor and reputation of public officials “is not based on the condition of the individual, but on the public interest in the actions he performs.” 387 2. In this case However and despite the preceding considerations, the Judgment concludes that the information contained in the statements made by Messrs. Mémoli were not of public interest, on the basis that they did not involve public officials or figures, 388 and did not relate to the functioning of the State’s institutions; 389 that they had been made in the context of a dispute between private individuals on matters that, possibly, would only affect the members of a private mutual association; that they were not of significant interest to the rest of the inhabitants of San Andrés de Giles; that the domestic courts had rejected the argument concerning public interest; that the Court was not a fourth instance and that, therefore, it did not find it justified in a case such as this to substitute or to annul the decision of the domestic courts in this regard. 390 3. Context: place where the statements were made Regarding the decision taken in the instant case, first, it must be reiterated that these proceedings should not have been limited to validating the assessment made by the State’s system of justice as to whether the matter of the burial niches was of public interest 391 – which was obviously in accordance with its domestic law – but rather, to the contrary, should have been aimed at determining whether it was in keeping with the provisions of the Convention. Second, it should be indicated that, in order to determine whether this case involves a matter of public interest, it is essential to consider, not whether the domestic litigation was between private individuals, because almost all litigations are, but rather the context in which the said statements were made and, above all, the place where they were made; namely, San Andrés de Giles, because, when they were made, the town had a population of around Para. 146 of the Judgment, citing: Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of January 27, 2009. Series C No. 193, para. 121, and Case of Fontevecchia and D`Amico v. Argentina, supra, para. 61. 385 386 Para. 145 of the Judgment. 387 Case of Kimel v. Argentina. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 2, 2008. Series C No. 177, para. 86; Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama, supra, para. 115; Case of Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela, supra, para. 83, and Case of Fontevecchia and D`Amico v. Argentina, supra, para. 47. Also, Cf. Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, supra, paras. 128 and 129; Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111, para. 103, and Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Series C No. 135, para. 84. 388 Such as in the cases of: Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 124; Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay, supra, paras. 91 to 94; Kimel v. Argentina, supra, para. 51; Tristán Donoso v. Panama, supra, paras. 93 and 115, and Fontevecchia and D`Amico v. Argentina, supra, para. 62. 389 Such as the Foreign Investment Committee in the Case of Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 19, 2006. Series C No. 151, para. 73, or the Armed Forces in the Case of Vélez Restrepo and family members v. Colombia, supra, para. 145. 390 Paras. 145 to 149 of the Judgment. 391 Para. 147 of the Judgment. 8