Court of Justice of the State considered the review and resulting annulment of the sentence imposed on Mr. Kimel admissible, in compliance with the measure of reparation ordered by this Court in that case. E. Continuation of the consequences of the criminal proceeding The foregoing is particularly relevant when it is observed that, as a result of the criminal conviction imposed on them, in order to guarantee the eventual result of the abovementioned civil action for damage, Messrs. Mémoli have been subject to a general injunction against the sale or encumbrance of property for more than 17 years, 410 which, moreover, was considered to have violated Articles 8(1) and 21 of the Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) of this instrument, in the fourth operative paragraph of the Judgment. Obviously, and contrary to the position adopted in the Judgment, which expressly refused to consider that the duration of the civil action constituted a violation of freedom of expression, 411 since the said general injunction is founded on what happened in the criminal proceeding, it can be understood as a measure with the evident result, among others, of inhibiting Messrs. Mémoli from expressing themselves in the press on the matter considered in the criminal proceeding; in other words, as censorship, or at least indirect censorship, of the right to freedom of thought and expression of these individuals. In this regard, it should be recalled that the Court has stated that “[t]he effect of [a] requirement resulting from a judgment may result in a restriction incompatible with Article 13 of the American Convention, if it produces a dissuasive, intimidating and inhibiting effect on all those who exercise the profession of journalism, which, in turn, obstructs the public debate on issues of interest to society.” 412 The Court has also indicated that “freedom of expression may be restricted unlawfully owing to conditions de facto that, directly or indirectly, endanger or increase the vulnerability of those who exercise it” and, thus, “the State must abstain from acting in a way that encourages, stimulates, favors or increases that vulnerability and must adopt, when pertinent, necessary and reasonable measures to prevent violations and to protect the rights of those who find themselves in that situation.” 413 Taking into account the preceding considerations, the State should have applied to Messrs. Mémoli, as a result of the action they filed on unconstitutionality, converted in appeal for review, 414 the new definition of the offense of defamation. The retroactive application of a more favorable criminal law is a right that the State must guarantee, even when the substantive effects of the criminal conviction have concluded. This is not due merely to the stigmatizing effect of criminal sanctions, but also because the civil consequences of the said sanctions are still being processed. In brief, the failure to apply the most favorable law in this case and, consequently, to annul the said sanctions and, thus, acquit Messrs. Mémoli entails a violation of Article 9 of the Convention and means that the State incurred international responsibility. 410 Paras. 109 and ff. of the Judgment. 411 Para. 185 of the Judgment. 412 Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 133. 413 Case of Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 26, 2010. Series C No. 213, para. 172. 414 Paras. 92 to 94 of the Judgment. 12