VIII RIGHT TO JUDICIAL GUARANTEES AND TO JUDICIAL PROTECTION A. Arguments of the parties and of the Commission 89. The Commission indicated that, under Ecuadorian law, the effective remedy to resolve the situation of the presumed victim was a criminal proceeding; however, “[t]he criminal proceeding initiated […] concluded with the prescription of the criminal action,” and “it f[ell] to the State, in its capacity as the entity responsible for punitive measures, to initiate and pursue proceedings to identify and, eventually, prosecute and punish the guilty parties, carrying out each step of the proceedings until their conclusion.” In this regard, the Commission underscored “the passive role of the prosecution service and the lack of diligence of the judge in the case,” as well as the “failure to pursue matters on an ex officio basis, and the absence of minimal guarantees of due diligence.” Lastly, in its final observations, the Commission indicted that in cases of medical malpractice, the State has a special obligation of care owing to the effects on the victim’s health and physical integrity, and must therefore ensure the reasonable promptness and speed of the proceedings in such cases, which did not occur in the instant case. 90. The representative agreed with the Commission’s arguments and that the administration of justice could have rectified the final result of the criminal proceedings […], because the promptness in the substantiation of the case depended [on it], and the result could have been other if the procedural time frames under Ecuadorian criminal law had been respected”; also, that “[a]n analysis of the proceedings […] reveals that the First Criminal Judge and the President of the First Criminal Appeals Court contributed to the unjustified delay in justice.” Also, in his final arguments, he concluded that the “absence of procedural activity by the authorities resulted in the delay in the substantiation of the proceedings.” Consequently, the “investigation was partial, fragmented and random, which had a notable impact on the slowness of the proceedings.” 91. The State, for its part, indicated that the presumed victims could have recused the judge who was hearing the case, which was a “legitimate option that the parties to a proceeding may exercise, since it is a guarantee […] that allows justice to be obtained, […] if a judicial official does not perform his or her functions appropriately,” and that “the State cannot be attributed with the fact that the right to judicial guarantees was not exercised as appropriate, [because] the recusal was and is a guarantee of constitutional rights.” Lastly, in its final arguments, the State described the procedure to obtain financial reparation from members of the administration of justice who, in the exercise of their functions, cause financial prejudice to the parties or to interested third parties, such as the procedural delay caused in the instant case. B. Considerations of the Court 92. In this chapter, the Court will analyze the respective domestic proceedings in light of the rights to judicial guarantees and to judicial protection established in Articles 8(1) and 25(1) of the Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) of this instrument, in order to determine whether or not the State failed to comply with its international obligations owing to the actions of its judicial organs. 93. The Court has indicated that “[t]he right to effective judicial protection requires judges to guide the proceedings in a way that avoids undue delays and obstructions 27