victim could have filed a civil action for damages against the judge responsible for the failure to hear the proceedings promptly. 111. In this regard, the representatives and the Commission argued that these remedies were not appropriate (supra paras. 89 and 90). i. Remedy of appeal 112. Regarding the appeal against the declaration of prescription, the Court observes that this remedy was provided by law and, under article 114 of the Penal Code, prescription is declared when the legal requirements are present. 144 Article 348(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 145 stipulated that the remedy of appeal was admissible to contest the declaration of prescription. Moreover, article 108 of the Penal Code indicates that “the prescription of the action, and also that of the punishment are interrupted if the individual convicted commits another offense that warrants the same or a greater punishment, before the time frame for prescription shall have expired.” 146 In addition, Article 398 of the said Code establishes that the proceedings in which prescription of the public criminal action is declared shall be referred to a higher instance for consultation, by both criminal courts and criminal judges. 147 113. The evidence in the case file reveals that, in Ecuador, the declaration of prescription was applicable ipso jure; in other words, it was sufficient for the judicial agent to verify that the time frame for prescription established by law had expired to declare its application. Furthermore, the case law of the National Court of Justice of Ecuador provided to the case file indicates that the declaration of prescription corresponds to the judge or court where the action prescribed, who has the obligation “to declare it ex officio or at the request of a party, when the legal requirements have been met, and not to refer the proceedings so that a higher court hears the appeal.” 148 In addition, if an appeal is filed, this will be rejected if “the case file shows that [the prescription] has not been interrupted.” 149 114. In this regard, the State did not explain how the said remedy could re-open the investigation or the criminal proceedings that had prescribed, and did not contest the decisions of the National Court of Justice. To the contrary, the State itself, in its final written arguments, indicated that “the former Supreme Court of Justice has developed extensive case law on the prescription of the criminal action, [in which it has] been emphatic in 144 Cf. Penal Code of Ecuador (1971), article 114. Prescription can be declared at the request of a party, or ex officio necessarily when the conditions required by this Code exist (unreferenced). 145 Cf. Code of Criminal Procedure (1983), supra, article 348. 146 Penal Code of Ecuador (1971). Article 108. Both the prescription of the action and that of the punishment are interrupted by the fact that the individual convicted commits another offense that warrants the same or a greater punishment, before the time frame for prescription has expired. 147 Code of Criminal Procedure, (1983), supra. Article 398: “Criminal judges shall obligatorily refer decisions on dismissal to the respective higher court for consultation. In cases where the prescription of the public criminal actions is declared, this shall also be referred to the higher court for consultation by both criminal courts and criminal judges. […].” 148 Cf. National Court of Justice of Ecuador. Rulings Nos. 06-2009 of January 13, 2009, and 20-2009 of January 21, 2009, available at http://www.cortenacional.gob.ec (final observations brief of the Commission, folio 796). 149 Cf. National Court of Justice of Ecuador. Ruling No. 19-2009 of January 15, 2009, available at: http://www.cortenacional.gob.ec (final observations brief of the Commission, folio 796). 32