57. Up until now, the Inter-American Court has used different aspects of the corpus juris on the right to health in order to found its arguments on the scope of the right to life or personal integrity, using the concept of decent life or another type of analysis based on the relationship between health and these civil rights (see supra para. 13). This argumentation strategy is valid and has permitted significant progress in inter-American case law. However, the main problems of this argumentation technique is that it prevents an in-depth analysis of the scope of the obligations of respect and guarantee in relation to the right to health, as in the Judgment that give rise to this separate opinion. In addition, there are some components of social rights that cannot be extended to standards of civil and political 96 rights. As I have underlined, “the specificity could be lost of both civil and political rights (that begin to cover everything) and of social rights (that are unable to project their 97 specificities).” 58. Considering that, in its evolutive case law, the Inter-American Court has already explicitly accepted the justiciability of Article 26 (see supra paras. 18 to 22), 98 in my opinion, the Inter-American Court now needs to resolve several aspects of this article, which poses the difficult future task of deciding three distinct questions relating to: (i) what rights does it protect; (ii) what type of obligations arise from those rights, and (iii) what are the implications of the principle of progressiveness. Evidently, my intention is not to try and decide these questions in this individual opinion. My desire is merely to establish a basis that could serve as a reflection for future developments of the case law of this InterAmerican Court. 59. Different positions exist with regard to the rights protected by Article 26 of the American Convention. Some people consider that this article constitutes a mere programmatic norm, without any type of effectiveness in itself. We do not find this conception adequate in view of the spirit of the Convention, which is inspired by the absence of hierarchy among the rights, as revealed by its Preamble, and by the need for all its provisions to have practical effects. 60. In addition, the said argument would be an evident step backward from the progressiveness that Article 26 itself expressly establishes for the States and that, of necessity, also applies to the Inter-American Court itself, because inter-American case law has already recognized the possibility of ruling on the contents of this article as indicated in the preceding paragraph, and has also recognized the full validity of all the provisions of the Pact of San Jose, precisely when deciding on the State’s argument concerning its lack of competence ratione materiae in relation to Article 26 of the Pact of San José: 99 […] the Court must take into account that the instruments accepting the optional clause concerning obligatory jurisdiction (Article 62(1) of the Convention) suppose the acknowledgement by the States that 96 On this aspect, see Melish, Tara J. “The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Beyond Progressivity,” in Langford, Malcolm (ed.), Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in Comparative and International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2008, chapter 19. 97 Parra Vera, Oscar, Justiciabilidad de los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales ante el Sistema Interamericano, Mexico, CNDH, 2011, p. 60. 98 Case of Acevedo Buendía et al. (“Discharged and Retired Employees of the Office of the Comptroller”), supra, paras. 92 to 106, particularly paras. 99 to 103; the last paragraph, in fine, indicates: “it should be stated that regressiveness is justiciable when economic, social and cultural right are at issue.” 99 Case of Acevedo Buendía et al. (“Discharged and Retired Employees of the Office of the Comptroller”), supra, para. 16. 20