time, either before bringing the case to trial or after the preliminary hearing, as established in the case law of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court. The request for annulment of November 8 contains arguments on both nullities of proceedings based on the violation of fundamental rights, during the investigation stage and also in the decision concluding the indictment stage. It can be clearly seen in this request that the annulment of the measures taken in the investigation stage is being argued (heading II of the request, see supra para. 96 of this opinion), while, starting under heading III (entitled “SUBMISSION OF OBJECTIONS” refers to the nullity of the indictment (not of the investigation during the preliminary investigation stage) that “preferably” – which does not mean necessarily – should be decided after the preliminary hearing. Indeed, as recorded in the Judgment, 95 in a judgment of February 14, 2002, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court had indicated, inter alia: If a request for annulment is filed, the supervisory judge – based on the urgency in view of the type of violation, and given the silence of the law – may, before ordering that the case go to trial, and at any time before that act, rule on it, even though it is preferable that this is done during the preliminary hearing.[…] (bold added). 98. As can be observed, the case law regarding the moment at which the request for the annulment of proceedings can be decided is not conclusive. The first request for annulment of October 4 should have been processed and decided during the investigation stage, in which it was alleged, essentially, that the right to the presumption of innocence had been violated owing to the implications of the book published by the Prosecutor General; the second request for annulment of November 8 – which, also, was not even processed – could be decided before or after the preliminary hearing, taking into account the clear division made in the request with regard to the nullity of the proceedings at the investigation stage, and with regard to the nullity of the decision concluding the indictment stage. The majority opinion admits the position of the State; in other words, the more restrictive interpretation of the right of access to justice of the presumed victim, which is evidently prohibited by Article 29 of the American Convention and runs counter to the pro homine principle. It is precisely the proven complexity of the dispute between the parties with regard to the requests for annulment and the fact that the principle purpose of the case focuses on the presumed violations of different judicial guarantees (due process) and judicial protection, that required the Inter-American Court to examine the merits of the case and to analyze the preliminary objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies in light of the arguments of the parties on the merits of the case. 99. The preceding considerations reveal, with all the more reason, why the examination of the dispute submitted with regard to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, cannot be separated from the analysis of the merits of the case – as the Inter-American Court has found in many cases according to its consistent case law in this regard – because the request for annulment in question, the procedural stage at which it should have been decided, as well as its reasonable time, are intrinsically related to the presumed violation of the rights to judicial guarantees and judicial protection referred to in Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention. 100. In this situation, the Court has affirmed previously that preliminary objections are acts that seek to prevent the analysis of the merits of the disputed matter by objecting to 95 Para. 124 of the Judgment. 25