the admissibility of a case or of the person, matter, time or place, provided that these objections are of a preliminary nature. 96 101. Since the matter of the admissibility of deciding the request for annulment in the absence of Mr. Brewer Carías cannot be examined without previously analyzing the merits of the case, it cannot be analyzed in the context of this preliminary objection. 97 Thus, the Inter-American Court should have rejected the preliminary objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies filed by the State and, consequently, proceeded to analyze the merits of this case. 2.2.c.b) The need for the presence of the accused at the preliminary hearing and the reasons why the hearing was postponed 102. On this issue, in the Judgment, it has been considered that the absence of Mr. Brewer Carías “has meant that it has not been possible to hold the preliminary hearing against him, so that it can be affirmed that the delay in deciding the requests for annulment could be attributed to his decision not to submit to the proceedings, and has an impact on the analysis of the unwarranted delay or reasonable time.” 98 103. The majority opinion based its reasoning on an interpretation of Article 7(5) of the American Convention. In this regard, the Judgment indicates that the presence of the accused is an essential requirement for the normal and legal implementation of the proceedings and that Article 7(5) of the Convention establishes that “release may be subject to guarantees to assure his appearance for trial,” so that States are authorized to establish domestic laws to ensure the appearance of the accused. 104. We also dissent from the majority opinion in this respect, because the determination of whether the proceedings against Mr. Brewer complied with the requirements of Article 7(5) of the American Convention is undoubtedly a matter relating to the merits. In any case, as revealed by the case file, it should be considered that Mr. Brewer Carías had been summoned for the preliminary hearing on several occasions; however, on none of these occasions was the postponement of the hearing due to the presumed victim’s absence, but rather to other reasons. 99 In this regard, the representatives have argued throughout the 96 Cf. Case of Las Palmeras v. Colombia. Preliminary objections. Judgment of February 4, 2000. Series C No. 67, para. 34; Case of Vélez Restrepo and family v. Colombia. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 3, 2012. Series C No. 248, para. 30; Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (In vitro fertilization) v. Costa Rica. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 28, 2012. Series C No. 257, para. 40, and Case of Mohamed v. Argentina. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 23, 2012. Series C No. 255, para. 23. 97 Cf. Case of Castañeda Gutman v. Mexico. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 6, 2008. Series C No. 184, para. 39, and Case of Vélez Restrepo and family v. Colombia. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 3, 2012. Series C No. 248, para. 30. 98 Para. 143 of the Judgment. 99 In para. 138 of the Judgment, it is affirmed that, on three occasions, the postponement or delay of the preliminary hearing was “directly related to the actions of Mr. Brewer or his defense counsel.” This is not entirely exact, because on the first occasion (November 17, 2005), the postponement was due to the fact that the Twentyfifth Judge recused himself, so that, evidently, exercising a right cannot be used against the currently presumed victim as claimed in the Judgment; on the second occasion, the hearing was not held, among other reasons, because “the Twenty-fifth Judge was on leave and the Twenty-fourth Supervisory Judge headed the court” and, on the third occasion, it can be seen that, in fact, it was presumed that Mr. Brewer Carías would not appear because he was not in the country (para. 139 of the Judgment), although this did not necessarily mean that he would not appear. Following the issue of the arrest warrant against Mr. Brewer Carías, the hearing was again postponed on thirteen occasions and, “only once was Mr. Brewer mentioned explicitly; specifically, on October 25, 2007, the hearing was postponed, because the court was awaiting ‘the appeal filed by the legal representative of [Mr. Brewer Carías] against the note that had been sent to INTERPOL” (para. 142 of the Judgment). As can be appreciated, 26