judicial jurisdiction, unless violation of the guarantees of due process in obtaining, investigating, verifying or assessing said evidence can be verified or proved directly. 411 330. For the purposes of finding the State internationally responsible, it is therefore irrelevant to identify specifically the commando or commandos who fired the shots that killed Meléndez Cueva and Peceros Pedraza. The Court holds, in any case, that given the circumstances in which the operation unfolded, it is reasonable that there would be no fully systematic, logical and consistent account of the chain of events, and it is not surprising that the narration of facts such as these should contain elements that could be considered a priori to be inaccurate or even contradictory. The important point, then, is that the declarants claimed to have killed them in the course of the operation and in the area where the bodies were found. 331. Both the Commission and the representatives point to another possible clue that a member of the group from the explosives deactivation unit (“UDEX”) who entered room “I” the day after the operation, where the bodies of these MRTA members were found, said that he had seen no “weapons near them at all”, and therefore thought that they had “been killed without putting up any resistance”.412 The Court recalls, in this regard, that it cannot fully dismiss the possibility that the scene of the events had been tampered with, and at the very least, this statement should be considered in the overall context of the evidence in the case files. B) Evidence by expert witnesses developed in the investigations 332. The body of Herma Luz Meléndez Cueva had received fourteen gunshot wounds, and Víctor Salomón Peceros Pedraza, nine.413 The report on human remains NN1-NN14 by Clyde C. Snow and José Pablo Baraybar expressly excluded the cases of Meléndez Cueva (NN10) and Peceros Pedraza (NN09) from its conclusions, with the following explanation: [F]ifty-seven percent of the cases (NN2, NN3, NN4, NN6, NN7, NN11, NN13, NN14) presented a type of injury that generally perforated the back of the neck, through the first and third cervical vertebrae, and exited through the first cervical vertebra […]. The fact that these lesions had followed the same path (back to front) suggests that all these victims were in the same position with respect to the shooter and had little or no mobility.414 333. The fact that they did not all present the same pattern of injury does not rule out the use of the selective instinctive shooting technique (supra para. 163), but it may suggest a situation in which the commandos were caught by surprise and turned to the use of force, as the hostages were still being evacuated. Cf. Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, supra, para. 201, and Case of de the Afro-descendant communities displaced from the Cacarica River Basin (Operation Genesis) v. Colombia, supra, para. 77. 411 412 Statement by Luis Ernesto Gálvez Melgar before the Specialized Provincial Prosecutor, May 11, 2001 (evidence file, volume XXVI, CVR evidence, folios 18338 to 18344). Cf. Tables 1 and 2 of the report on forensic examinations by the Institute of Forensic Medicine on MRTA members who died at the residence of the Japanese ambassador to Peru on August 16, 2001 (evidence file, volume I, annex 7 to the case submission brief, folios 180 to 181). See also: Forensic examination report, case 12,444, State of Peru before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Report No. 2, June 22, 2012, by Juan Manuel Cartagena Pastor, stating, “[t]he [n]umber of shots at target NN9 was at least 12”, and that the body of NN10 had received at least “15” (evidence file, volume XXIX, evidence submitted in the public hearing, folios 20558 and 20561). 413 Report on human remains NN1-NN4 attributed to the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, by Clyde C. Snow and José Pablo Baraybar, Peruvian Forensic Anthropology Team, July, 2001 (evidence file, volume II, annex 12 to the case submission brief, folio 698). 414