its agents carried out in their official capacity, even if they are acting outside the limits of their competence”.7 3. The Court found in the instant case that it was not pertinent to order the payment of financial compensation for “nonpecuniary damage” for violation of the right to life against Eduardo Nicolás Cruz Sánchez or for the violations it adjudged against the family members declared victims, as it held that the judgment constituted, per se, sufficient redress and that the other measures of reparation it ordered (obligation to investigate, rehabilitation, and publication of the judgment), given the circumstances of this case, provided sufficient redress under the terms of Article 63(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights.8 4. There is no debate about whether the measures ordered for rehabilitation, dissemination of the judgment and pursuit of the investigations on the extrajudicial execution of Eduardo Nicolás Cruz Sánchez are fitting measures to compensate for the damage under discussion. I do believe, nonetheless, that in this case, pursuant to the principle of “comprehensive compensation” and the case law of the Inter-American Court, that it would be right to award a reasonable amount to indemnify “nonpecuniary damage” caused to family members who have been declared victims. 5. Therefore, I am offering this separate opinion with the intent of developing the principles involved in the duty to redress human rights violations and, more particularly, compensation for “nonpecuniary damage,” bearing in mind that the representatives of the victims did not request an amount in pecuniary damages. II. ON THE DUTY TO REDRESS 6. Pursuant to the provisions of Article 63(1) of the American Convention, 9 the Court has held that “every violation of an international obligation which results in harm creates a duty to make adequate reparation, and that this provision reflects a customary norm that constitutes one of the fundamental principles of contemporary international law on State responsibility.” 10 7. Based on this provision of the Convention, and in view of the broad powers it assigns to the Inter-American Court, the Court has pioneered the move toward a broad spectrum of measures of reparation for human rights violations, and this has become its landmark feature by comparison with other international courts; 11 the primary purpose of these measures has been full restitution 7 Para. 281 of the judgment. 8 Paras. 483, 484 and 485 of the judgment. Article 63(1) of the Convention says, “[i]f the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party.” 9 10 Para. 451 of the judgment. 11 For example, the European Court of Human Rights has understood the concept of restitutio in integrum in its reparations as those measures whose purpose is to restore the situation to its previous state as before the violation, and this has led spontaneously to the amendment of domestic laws or measures adopted specifically for the particular complainant. Nonetheless, the practice as described is the exception, as in most cases, the European Court finds that it is not possible to create restitutio in integrum, and the European Convention on Human Rights has therefore granted the European Court the power to order measures of just satisfaction to the injured party. Article 41 of the European Convention says, in this regard: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party”, which generally takes the form of pecuniary compensation. Nevertheless, it has been that a literal interpretation of Article 41 of that Convention would lead to a situation in which any evaluation by the European Court concerning a violation of the Convention must be limited narrowly to the individual harmed by the violation, and therefore, the individual measures, particularly those of just satisfaction, would make it impossible to meet the objective of protecting human rights. Cf. García Ramírez, Sergio y Zanghi, Claudio, "Las jurisdicciones regionales de derechos humanos y las 2