would provide protection for the strike force and stand ready to fire if any guerrilla endangered the lives of hostages or commandos during the operation; (2) the security unit, under the command of Army Lieutenant Colonel Juan Alfonso Valer Sandoval, subdivided into two subgroups, “whose mission was to provide cover to the strike forces that would be entering the residence through the main tunnel and rescuing the hostages”; 141 (3) the support and evacuation unit, under the command of Army Lieutenant Colonel Juan Chávez Núñez, subdivided into three subgroups: (a) team one, under the command of Army Infantry Lieutenant Colonel César Díaz Peche; (b) team two, under the command of Army Infantry Lieutenant Colonel Roger Zevallos Rodríguez, and (c) team three, under the command of Army Artillery Major José Flor Marca; their task was primarily to provide emergency medical care and evacuation for wounded hostages, commandos, and MRTA guerrillas, evacuate uninjured hostages and, in coordination with the strike forces, deliver the property into the hands of the proper authorities;142 (4) a unit of personnel located in neighboring houses, under the command of Army Lieutenant Colonel Jesús Salvador Zamudio Aliaga, whose mission was to provide protection for the different properties surrounding the residence, which had been rented out for the rescue operation by orders of Army Lieutenant Colonel and member of the SIN, Roberto Edmundo Huamán Ascurra; 143 (5) a unit of local neighborhood security personnel, under the command of Police Colonel Jesús Artemio Konja Chacón, responsible for providing protection to Marconi Street, Burgos Street and Barcelona Street; 144 (6) the unit of SIN personnel, under the command of the President’s intelligence advisor Vladimiro Montesinos Torres, and (7) the unit of personnel from the Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional-Dirección de Inteligencia Estratégica (SIN-DIE) National Intelligence Service-Directorate of Strategic Intelligence, responsible for transferring wounded hostages and commandos to the hospitals of the National Police of Peru and the Peruvian Army. 158. “Plan Nipón 96” called for maneuvers to take place in three stages. 145 The first stage, “approach,” called for a secret motorized movement from the base of the First Division of the Army Special Forces to the buildings located on Marconi Street and Tomas Edison Street, which would be used as mustering points. The second stage, “action on the target”, was divided into three phases. In the first phase, strike forces would move from the mustering points to strategic positions on the building. In the second phase, dynamite would be placed at strategic places on the building to open access to the residence. In the third phase, the countdown would begin from “5” to “0” and the commandos would initiate “violent, simultaneous ingress” to take control of the building. The third stage would begin as soon as the building was under 13420 to 13421), and ruling by the Transitory Criminal Law Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice on an appeal to vacate judgment, 3521-2012 July 24, 2013 (evidence file, volume XXI, helpful evidence, folio 14674). CF. Ruling by the Third Special Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court of Lima, October 15, 2012 (evidence file, volume XX, annexed to the representatives’ observations on the State’s preliminary objections, folio 13420). 141 Cf. Plan of Operation B. “NIPON” 96 / “TENAZ” (Tenaz Patrol), January 1997, p. 6 (evidence file, volume I, annex 2 to the case submission brief, folio 37). 142 The judgment from the domestic courts held that Roberto Huamán Ascurra had been “directly assigned […] to rent neighboring houses, build the tunnels and pay the miners, and build the mock-ups and the replica.” He had other duties as well, such as taking “charge of intelligence personnel managing communications with hostages inside the residence, filming, photographing, and transcribing conversations, and overseeing personnel responsible for transferring wounded hostages and commandos to the hospitals of the National Police of Peru and the Central Military Hospital of the Army of Peru.” Ruling by the Third Special Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court of Lima, October 15, 2012 (evidence file, volume XX, annexed to the representatives’ observations on the State’s preliminary objections, folio 13494). 143 Cf. Ruling by the Third Special Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court of Lima, October 15, 2012 (evidence file, volume XX, annexed to the representatives’ observations on the State’s preliminary objections, folio 13465). 144 Cf. Plan of Operation B. “NIPON” 96 / “TENAZ” (Tenaz Patrol), January, 1997, pp. 1 to 7 (evidence file, volume I, annex 2 to the case submission brief, folios 31 to 38), and Statement by Carlos Alberto Tello Aliaga before a public attestor, January 29, 2014 (evidence file, volume XXX, affidavits,folios 20734 to 20744). 145