[… i]t has been shown that the order given by the chairman of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces, Division General Nicolás de Bari Hermoza Ríos, under whom the plan of operations to be called “Nipón 96” was developed, called for absolute respect for human rights, and that provisions had been made to evacuate the subversives, which therefore meant that there was a possibility of injury or arrest of the latter, in other words, there was no order whatsoever to kill the hostage-takers indiscriminately […].275 221. The chamber found that this was not a case of crimes against humanity. It held: […] we do not find this to be a case of a crime against humanity, which is a concept of criminology, basically because it was not committed as part of a state policy for selective or systematic elimination of a subversive group; this court has not seen proof that it was designed, planned or overseen by the highest levels of state power, or executed by public agents, that is, military intelligence officers, or in the framework of a state policy under orders by the intelligence service.276 222. The majority judgment by the Third Special Criminal Chamber concerning the MRTA members was that the deaths of Herma Luz Meléndez Cueva and Víctor Salomón Peceros Pedraza had taken place in combat.277 The chamber reached this conclusion based on the following considerations: (i) the statement by two commandos who had admitted killing Herma Luz Meléndez Cueva and Víctor Salomón Peceros Pedraza in combat when the two had entered armed into room “I” at the time when the Japanese hostages were being evacuated; (ii) that all the dead MRTA members had been shot many times, as had Herma Luz Meléndez Cueva and Víctor Salomón Peceros Pedraza, because the commandos were moving two by two through the rooms of the residence and shooting when they saw subversives; (iii) that the expert opinions were unable to identify what the effect of the gunshots had been because it was impossible to determine which one had been fatal; (iv) that the only incriminating information was the statement by Hidetaka Ogura, who had been unable to obtain a good enough sight line to see whether the two victims had surrendered, because the metal ladder placed on the balcony for the freed hostages to climb down blocked his view of the alleged facts.278 223. The court drew the following conclusions about the death of Eduardo Nicolás Cruz Sánchez: [T]he majority of the expert opinions examined throughout the process […] demonstrate that the guerrilla known as “Tito” died from a single bullet to the head at a distance ranging from 60 centimeters to six or seven meters, that the body may have been almost completely immobilized or the head may have been inclined slightly downward at the time of impact, and finally, that the head was hit by a a nine-millimeter projectile. This leads the majority to believe, […] in principle, that the subversive was killed after being detained, and the final proven fact is that he was in the power of the police from the national intelligence service under the command of Zamudio Aliaga (a circumstance that Ruling by the Third Special Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court of Lima, October 15, 2012 (evidence file, volume XX, annexed to the representatives’ observations on the State’s preliminary objections, folio 13498). 275 Ruling by the Third Special Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court of Lima, October 15, 2012 (evidence file, volume XX, annexed to the representatives’ observations on the State’s preliminary objections, folio 13677). 276 Cf. Ruling by the Third Special Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court of Lima, October 15, 2012 (evidence file, volume XX, annexed to the representatives’ observations on the State’s preliminary objections, folio 13682). 277 Cf. Ruling by the Third Special Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court of Lima, October 15, 2012 (evidence file, volume XX, annexed to the representatives’ observations on the State’s preliminary objections, folios 13682 and 13683). 278