of having executed or tolerated practices on its territory such as those described in the instant case. This is why it will now proceed to examine the evidence and, notwithstanding what has already been said, be able to establish the truth of the allegations in a convincing manner. 360 283. In the instant case, because the use of lethal force occurred as part of an operation designed specifically for particular circumstances, the Inter-American Court finds it appropriate, as the European Court of Human Rights has done, to examine the process of planning and control of the operations, to find whether the State sought to “minimise, to the greatest extent possible, recourse to lethal force and human losses, and whether all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of a security operation were taken.” 361 284. The Court finds it significant for the purpose of examining this case to emphasize that even under trying circumstances, the State: (i) designed a rescue operation, (ii) selected qualified personnel to conduct it, (iii) built a replica of the place where the hostages were being held,362 (iv) provided intensive training for the officers selected, to ensure that the operation would be effective, and (v) planned Operation “Nipón 96” based on circumstances in which “daily life” was taking place inside the ambassador’s residence (supra paras. 151 to 159). The Court reiterates that the primary objective of the operation was to safeguard the lives of the hostages. 285. The representatives and the Commission assured in their closing arguments that they did not challenge the design and planning of the operation, but the representatives also claimed in the hearing that the possibility that MRTA members might be captured alive was neither anticipated nor put into practice. The State questioned this line of reasoning, claiming that such a statement actually made reference to the technique used to take control of the property, known as selective instinctive shooting; thus, in the State’s view, it was clearly contradictory to suggest that the representatives had not questioned the design and planning of the operation. The State did not deny that it had used this technique but did note that “it is not an action prohibited under international law.” 286. The Court notes that, at least at the operational level, some of the planning had indeed considered the possibility of capturing the MRTA members. 363 Similarly, most of the commandos stated that the planning phase of the operation did in fact consider the capture of MRTA members, who were to be searched, disarmed, neutralized, and evacuated, upon which commandos were to immediately notify their ranking officers and await further instructions. Nonetheless, the priorities were, first, to rescue the hostage, second, to evacuate wounded commandos, and third, to evacuate MRTA members. These declarants also said consistently that they had received no orders, instructions or comments from their commanding officers to eliminate all the MRTA members.364 To the contrary, they said that their only mission was to rescue the hostages alive. Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits, supra, para. 129, and Case of Gutiérrez and family v. Argentina, supra, para. 79. 360 ECtHR, Ergi v. Turkey, No. 23818/94. Judgment of July 28, 1998, para. 79, and Finogenov and Others v. Russia, Nos. 18299/03 and 27311/03. Judgment of December 20, 2011, para. 208. 361 Even though it was not perfectly identical to the original residence, as explained in the “procedure to “reconstruct the facts.” 362 Cf. Plan of Operations A. “NIPON” 96 (1st Div FFEE), January 1997, pp. 2 to 5 (evidence file, volume I, annex 2 to the case submission brief, folios 26 to 29) and Plan of Operations B. “NIPON” 96 / “TENAZ” (“Tenaz” Patrol), January 1997, pp. 4 and 6 (evidence file, volume I, annex 2 to the case submission brief, folios 35 and 37). 363 Cf. Statements contained in the case file of the military courts (evidence file, further helpful evidence, volumes XXII to XXV). 364