482. International case law has repeatedly established that the judgment constitutes per se a form of reparation.509 The Court’s case law has further developed the concept of nonpecuniary damage, holding that it “may include both the suffering and distress caused to the direct victims and their next of kin, and the impairment of values that are highly significant to them, as well as other nonmaterial changes in the living conditions of the victim or family members.”510 483. The Court considers that, in the instant case, it is not pertinent to order the payment of financial compensation for nonpecuniary damage for violation of the right to life in injury of Eduardo Nicolás Cruz Sánchez, bearing in mind that this judgment constitutes, per se, sufficient redress for such damage, 511 and considering that measures concerning the investigation and the publication of this judgment that have already been ordered provide due reparation under the terms of Article 63(1) of the American Convention. 484. The Court also maintains that, with respect to Edgar Odón Cruz Acu��a, the measures of rehabilitation awarded in this judgment provide sufficient, appropriate redress to compensate for the damage done to his personal integrity. 485. Furthermore, concerning the harm derived from violation of Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention in injury of Florentín Peceros Farfán, Nemecia Pedraza de Peceros, Jhenifer Solanch Peceros Quispe, Herma Luz Cueva Torres and Edgar Odón Cruz Acuña in varying measure as a consequence of the facts in the instant case, which was upheld herein, the Court holds that the present judgment is in itself a form of compensation and moral satisfaction for the victims and their relatives.512 The reparations involving investigation and publication of this judgment, as ordered above, also provide due compensation under the terms of Article 63(1) of the American Convention. E. Costs and expenses Arguments of the parties 486. The representatives said that, for most of the domestic legal proceedings on the case, the family had received support from APRODEH, which as a nonprofit organization, “has not charged the family any fees whatsoever.” The representatives therefore asked the Court to set an amount in equity for expenses incurred by APRODEH as legal representatives of the victims in the domestic and international processes. The representatives also noted that CEJIL had been helping with documentation for the case since 2001, and later joined the litigation in the international process. According to the representatives, all this cost CEJIL money for travel, hotel lodging, communication expenses, photocopies, office supplies, shipping, and the expenditures for legal work specifically on this case and the work of investigation, compiling and submitting evidence, holding interviews and preparing briefs. They provided a detailed table itemizing all the expenditures CEJIL had incurred and asked the Court to set an amount Cf. Case of El Amparo v. Venezuela. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 14, 1996. Series C No. 28, para. 35, and Case of Rodríguez Vera et al. (the Disappeared from the Palace of Justice) v. Colombia, supra, para. 600. 509 Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 26, 2001. Series C No. 77, para. 84, and Case of Rodríguez Vera et al. (the Disappeared from the Palace of Justice) v. Colombia, supra, para. 600. 510 Cf. Case of Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 20, 2005. Series C No. 126, para. 130, and Case of Raxcacó Reyes v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 15, 2005. Series C No. 133, para. 131. 511 512 Cf. Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs, supra, para. 225.