exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law. 32 The Court recalls that the rule on prior exhaustion of domestic remedies was conceived in the interest of the State, relieving it of the need to face international proceedings for actions ascribed to it before resolving the dispute using its own processes. 33 This entails not only the formal existence of such remedies, but also their appropriateness and effectiveness, as shown by the exceptions set out in Article 46(2) of the Convention.34 49. Similarly, the Court has consistently maintained that an objection to the exercise of its jurisdiction based on the alleged failure to exhaust domestic remedies should be lodged at the correct stage of the proceedings, that is, during the admissibility stage before the Commission.35 A State that claims failure to exhaust domestic remedies needs to spell out the particular domestic remedies that have not yet been exhausted and demonstrate that they were in fact available and were appropriate, fitting and effective. 36 Again, it is not the task of the Court or the Commission to identify ex officio the domestic remedies that remain to be exhausted, and international bodies are not expected to rectify a lack of precision in the State’s arguments.37 50. The Court recalls that the first decision to be made on a preliminary objection of this kind is whether it was raised at the correct stage of the proceedings. The State, notes the Court, did in fact submit its observations on the initial petition of December 1, 2003, asking the Commission to [declare the inadmissibility of petition 136/2003, as provided in Articles 46(1)(a) [sic] of the American Convention, in keeping with Article 31 of the [Commission’s] Rules of Procedure,” based on the fact that “a criminal trial was underway in the domestic jurisdiction” and that “the relevant remedy had not been exhausted.”38 The Court therefore holds that the State filed its objection at the correct time. 51. The Commission replied to the State’s claim in its Admissibility Report, saying that even though a criminal process was still open in the ordinary jurisdiction for the alleged commission of the crimes associated with the case, the exceptions to the rule on the exhaustion of domestic remedies provided for in Article 46(2)(a) 39 and (c)40 of the American Convention were Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Preliminary Objections. Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 1, para. 85, and Case of Argüelles et al. v. Argentina. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 20, 2014. Series C No. 288, para. 42. 32 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits. Judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C No. 4, para 61, and Case of Argüelles et al. v. Argentina, supra, para. 43. 33 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits, supra, para. 63, and Case of Human Rights Defender et al. v. Guatemala, supra, para. 20. 34 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Preliminary objections, supra, para. 88, and Case of Argüelles et al. v. Argentina, supra, para. 42. 35 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Preliminary objections, supra, paras. 88 and 91, and Case of Argüelles et al. v. Argentina, supra, para. 43. 36 Cf. Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 30, 2009. Series C No. 197, para. 23, and Case of Argüelles et al. v. Argentina, supra, para. 44. 37 Report 77-2003-JUS/CNDH-SE of December 1, 2003 (case file of the proceedings before the Commission, volume III, folios 1632 to 1641). 38 Article 46(2)(a) of the Convention states that the provisions on exhaustion of domestic remedies and the six-month term do not apply when “the domestic legislation of the state concerned does not afford due process of law for the protection of the right or rights that have allegedly been violated.” 39 Article 46(2)(c) of the Convention states that the provisions on exhaustion of domestic remedies and the six-month term do not apply when “there has been unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment under the aforementioned remedies.” 40