merits of a petition or claim, except when, in exceptional circumstances, the Commission decides to defer the consideration of admissibility until the debate and decision on the merits, in application of Article 36 of its Rules of Procedure.” The State maintained that in the instant case, the Commission had handled the admissibility and the merits separately; thus, if the Commission had established its human and material jurisdiction, it could not “arbitrarily expand this jurisdiction during the merits stage,” because such an action ceased to be available upon conclusion of the admissibility process. Nevertheless, according to the State, the Commission sought to “validate its procedural error by stating that the ‘petitioners had raised the claim only after the Admissibility Report.’” The State held, in this regard, that any argument on admissibility submitted by the petitioners after the admissibility report had been adopted was out of order, and the Commission was not entitled to weigh it during the merits stage. This reflected the spirit of the rules on the system of individual petitions and the provisions of Article 30(5) of the Commission's Rules of Procedure, because “accepting it would infringe the principle of legal certainty, as such a procedure is not allowed under any of the rules of the inter-American system for the protection of human rights.” It also argued that the time limits on the admissibility stage were clear in Articles 30(6) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure, which, “while addressed exclusively to the State, can nonetheless be required of petitioners in application of the principle of procedural equity.” 55. The State closed by explaining that the Commission, in its Report on the Merits, had concluded that, “in application of the iura novit curia” principle, it would proceed to offer its views on the alleged violation of the right to personal integrity of the family members of the alleged victims. The State objected, as this matter had not been discussed during the admissibility stage, and argued that the application of this principle cannot be arbitrary or unrestricted. It explained that, in the instant case, the application of the principle was delimited by the Commission’s decision in the Admissibility Report concerning its jurisdiction ratione personae. In the view of the State, during the merits stage, the Commission was entitled to assert violations of rights other than those admitted, only if based on proven facts and limited strictly to the persons who had allegedly been executed. It argued, therefore, that legal certainty and procedural equality had been undermined in the instant case, and the Court should review the legality of the Report on the Merits concerning the identification of alleged victims and human rights not addressed in Admissibility Report 13/04. 56. The Commission replied that the State, from the very beginning of the case, had been aware of the existence and even names of some of the family members of the alleged victims, who in fact had lodged the petition. Subsequent to the Admissibility Report, the parties had updated the judicial case files. The Commission had found that these same files, together with alleged facts known by the State from the time of the initial petition and during the processing of the merits, provided content and more complete information on the personal integrity of the family members of alleged victims. It emphasized that the alleged violation was based on harm caused by the alleged executions and their alleged impunity, both of which were key points from the time of the initial petition. The Commission explained that, in accordance with its own practice, the admissibility report is limited or bound prima facie by the evidence available at the time it is issued and the cause of action that will be examined during the merits stage. Therefore, the detailed analysis of the facts, based on evidence received, is performed during the merits. From the time of the initial petition and throughout the process before the Commission, the State had been aware of the existence of the family members of the alleged victims, as well as their role in the domestic processes, and it was during the merits stage that this was made explicit and further information was provided. The Commission asked the Court to deny the preliminary objection, as it was unfounded. 57. The representatives agreed that the admissibility stage and the merits stage in proceedings before the Commission served different purposes and should not be confused with